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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DECISION IN
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1. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the European Commission on July 3, 20011 to
stop the merger between General Electric Company ("GE") and
Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell") on the basis of Euro-
pean Community merger control2 was groundbreaking, and, not
surprisingly, led to a very harsh exchange of remarks between
parties on both sides of the Atlantic.3 Although it is certainly re-
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I Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell v. Commission (2001)
[hereinafter GE/Honeywell], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/competition/mergers/cases/index/by-nrm_44.html#m_2220.
2 This Article will refer to the merger control of the European Community
("EC") rather than the European Union ("EU") because the merger control rules
pertain only to the EC and not to the EU. With regard to the relationship between
the two, it can be said that the EC (together with the Coal and Steel Community
and the European Atomic Energy Community) forms one pillar of the EU, with
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Cooperation in Criminal Mat-
ters forming the other two pillars.
3 Democratic Senators John "Jay" D. Rockefeller, IV and Ernest F. Hollings
warned of possible retaliatory action by Washington. See William Drozdiak,
European Union Kills GE Deal, WASH. Posr, Jul. 4, 2001, at Al ("U.S. Senators...
warned that thwarting the merger would... compel retaliatory action by Wash-
ington."). U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill called the decision "off the
wall" and said that something needed to be done to bring the EU back in line.
Brian M. Carney, Loggerheads: Mario Monti, Central Planner, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jul. 6,
2001, at 6. Similar comments were made when the Commission investigated the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger. See Amy Ann Karpel, The European Commis-
sion's Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-
EU Cooperation in the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029, 1031-32 (1998) (citing
U.S. lawmakers' suggestion that "EU concerns were based purely on its protec-
tionist interest[s]" and that EU authorities "should not stand in the way of the
[Boeing/McDonnell Douglas] merger"); Sondra Roberto, The Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas Merger Review: A Serious Stretch of European Competition Powers, 24 BROOK.
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markable that, for the first time, the Commission stopped a U.S.
merger that had already received clearance from its "home"
authority (in this case the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")), the
outcome of GEIHoneywell did not come as much of a surprise to
many observers. The truth of the matter is that it was only a mat-
ter of time before the different merger control regimes in Europe
and the United States would arrive at different results for the same
merger. The problem of having different merger control regimes
in two of the world's largest economies had simply been dormant
for a long time.4
This Article is a revised version of an article that was the basis
of a presentation at the April 2002 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Economic Law Symposium, which was
published in the Journal's Summer 2002 issue.5 During the Sym-
posium and later that month at the ABA's antitrust section meeting
in Washington D.C., I came across a number of new and very in-
teresting comments and views on the GE/Honeywell decision and
its impact on international merger control and decided to change
the main thrust and focus of the article in order to address and ac-
commodate these comments. From the Symposium itself and sub-
sequent discussions I have had with competition lawyers in
Europe and in the United States, I have concluded that the discus-
sion about GEiHoneywell has very much become a discussion about
whether the U.S. or the European merger control system is supe-
rior. Thus, despite all representations to the contrary, the discus-
sion has turned into a contest between the merger control regimes,
and, most importantly, their respective goals. It would be a most
interesting task to focus the Article on the topic of goals alone and
consequently on the battle between the Chicago and the Freiburg
Schools of thought, which are respectively - at least to a large ex-
tent- the bases for the interpretation of the U.S. and the European
merger control system. However, instead of concentrating on the
philosophical and theoretical aspects of merger control in general,
J. INT'L L. 593, 594 (1998) (discussing Congressional criticism of the EC's protec-
tionist motives).
4 Mario Monti, Antitrust in the US and Europe: A History of Convergence,
Speech presented at the General Counsel Roundtable of the American Bar Asso-
ciation (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news
/speeches/2001/011114mm.htm.
- Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the European
Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcoN. L. 325 (2002).
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this Article endeavors to address the position of the GE/Honeywell
decision under European law and its practical impact on interna-
tional merger control. Where appropriate, however, the Article
will make references to the theoretical side of merger control in
Europe and the United States.
This Article will first provide a very brief overview6 of EC
competition law and, to a limited extent, will address how this
framework compares to U.S. antitrust law. In this context, refer-
ences to the different schools of thought will be made, albeit in a
limited scope. Next, the Commission's decision in GE/Honeywell
will be outlined and analyzed in detail. Finally, this Article will
address the question of international cooperation in merger con-
trol, if and how this cooperation was affected by the Commission's
decision in GE/Honeywell, and where international cooperation is
headed in the future.
2. DOGMATIC BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE
"Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to
give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law -
what are its goals?" 7 This easy-sounding but very accurate state-
ment made by Robert Bork in his Antitrust Paradox of 1978, al-
though aimed at the discussion in the United States at the time, can
also be used to pinpoint the debate that is going on right now be-
tween the United States and Europe. Interestingly, and as Bork
continued, in over eighty years, the U. S. courts have never settled
for long upon a definitive statement of antitrust law's goal and, at
the time of writing his book in the 1970s, the courts seemed as far
from doing so as ever.8 GElHoneywell and its subsequent discus-
sion show that the question is still far from being answered in the
international community. Therefore, in order to understand the
discussion that became ever more visible after GElHoneywell, one
6 It is not intended to, nor can it, encompass in depth all the aspects of Euro-
pean merger control. For a comprehensive overview of the European merger
control regime, see C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL (3d ed. 2000);
CHRISTOPHER JONES & ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-DiAZ, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION
(1992); Jost RIvAS, THE EU MERGER REGULATION AND THE ANATOMY OF THE MERGER
TASK FORCE (1999).
7 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A PoLIcY AT WAR WIT ITSELF 50
(reprinted with new introduction 1993) (1978).
8 Id.
2002]
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has to examine what the current goals of antitrust law are in
Europe and in the United States.
European merger control is, to a large extent, based on the
German concept of competition law. German law, in turn, has
been largely influenced by the so-called ordoliberal school of
thought,9 developed to a large extent in the South German Univer-
sity of Freiburg.10 Under this approach, it is believed that every
individual should enjoy economic freedom as part of his political
freedom and, therefore, that competition should be completely free
from any form of government interference." However, this belief
was based on the assumption that individuals competed with one
another 2-as was indeed the case in the early to mid-eighteenth
century economy. 3 The Industrial Revolution in the late nine-
teenth century brought this situation to an end and the market be-
came more and more the playing field of large entities. These enti-
ties sometimes became so strong that competitors were driven out
of the market and effective competition was eliminated. 4 German
ordoliberals therefore propagated a system where the market play-
ers would freely compete with each other, while the State would
guarantee and provide for an order or constitution according to
9 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND CO[PETITION IN TwENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECrING PROME-EUS 232-66 (1998) [hereinafter PROMETHEUS]; David J. Gerber,
Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the
"New" Europe, 42 AM. J. CoM. L. 25 (1994).
10 Hence the label "Freiburg School."
11 Gerber, AM. J. COMP. L., supra note 9, at 36; Barry J. Rodger, Competition
Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 289,
293 (2000). See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776)
(arguing that the competitive interaction of free individuals seeking personal gain
produces wealth).
12 PROMETHEUS, supra note 9, at 23.
13 It must not be forgotten that the original law against restraints of trade, i.e.,
agreements not to practice a trade, was aimed at preventing a man from signing
away his livelihood in a society where extensive governmental and guild restric-
tions might prevent him from finding comparative employment See Robert H.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775, 784 (1965) (explaining that the original law against restraints of
trade was aimed at protecting individuals). Thus the alleged first noted antitrust
case, the often quoted and rarely read Dyer's Case of 1415, a nine line report
where a John Dier undertook not to use his dyer's craft in a certain town for half a
year, and the judge held that such a bond was void on account of the condition
being against common law. Y.B. 2 Hen. 5., fol. 5, Pasch. pl. 26 (1415).
14 Another danger to competition was the increasing formation of cartels as a
response to the economic crises in the late eighteenth century.
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which such competition was, and remained, possible. Part of this
order was the control and restriction of overly powerful single en-
tities.15 This approach was adopted in Germany after World War II
in its first competition law.16 This competition law and thinking
later also found their way into the Treaty of Rome and the Euro-
pean merger control regime.' 7
At least one of the goals of antitrust law in Germany and
Europe is the protection of small and medium enterprises from
dominant competitors. The underlying reason for this goal is that
it was believed that the participation of smaller businesses would
ensure a competitive market-and such competitive market would
benefit consumers.18 German and European antitrust laws thus
aim at benefiting almost everyone involved-small and medium
competitors as well as consumers-maybe with the exception of
entities who are, or are poised to become, dominant. There is no
clear (dogmatic) indication as to which party should benefit most
from the antitrust legislation. To reduce this approach to a "big is
bad" label is therefore most certainly an oversimplification.19 Big is
not always and not necessarily bad; it could be bad if it leads to the
15 Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in
GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, 16 ANTITRUST 18, 20 (2001) (arguing that the
European caution towards large entities "appears dangerously close to the... 'Big
is Bad' doctrine from the 1960s" and has no sound economic basis).
16 For an overview of the development of German competition law and its
relation to the ordoliberal school of thought, see PROMETHEUS, supra note 9, at 266-.
94.
17 To a large extent, today's European antitrust policy is thus based on the
German model. See Gerber, AM. J. COMp. L., supra note 9, at 71-74 (noting that
most leading German representatives in the founding of the EC were closely asso-
dated with ordoliberalism); Rodger, supra note 11, at 306 (discussing the role of
ordoliberalism in the EC competition model). One consequence of this influence
has been the prominent role of German competition lawyers in the administration
of European competition law. Since the establishment of the EC, a German na-
tional has primarily held the Directorate General position responsible for Compe-
tition: of the six Directors General since 1958, five have been German. The last
German to hold this post, Alexander Schaub, was removed from his post as part
of a general rotation of high-level officials who have held the post for more than
seven years. In a departure from German dominance, Briton Philip Lowe re-
placed him.
18 In the early twentieth century, Socialist politicians especially favored this
approach because they equated "consumers" with "workers," their clientele, who
deserved protection.
19 See Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias Against Small Business:
Kodak, Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 231, 237
(2001) (framing an analysis of small and big businesses in terms of promoting
competition and remaining neutral about size).
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demise of competitors-and in the eyes of the Europeans thus ul-
timately also damages consumer interests. Based on these ideas,
both the German 20 and the European system ask whether or not a
merger will lead to the creation of a dominant position. The sub-
stantive test under European law is therefore, as will be shown in
more detail below, one of market dominance (the "MD test").
Interestingly, and in contrast to its later development, the
original development of antitrust law in the United States was not
very different from the one just described in Europe. In the late
1800s, concerns grew in the United States about the rising power of
giant combinations called trusts-Standard Oil being one of the
most prominent among them.21 The Sherman Act was enacted in
response to these concerns.22 In 1914, the Sherman Act was fol-
lowed by the Clayton Act, which was specifically aimed to "pro-
hibit certain trade practices which... are not covered by the
[Sherman Act] ... and thus to arrest the creation of trusts, con-
spiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and before consum-
mation."23 However, the relevant provision in the Clayton Act did
not have much practical relevance until the changes effected by the
Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950.24 Hence, until 1950, merger control in
20 Section 36(1) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition ("GWB") states
that a merger has to be prohibited if it can be expected to create or strengthen a
dominant position. Uniquely, the GWB gives clear levels of market share above
which one or several competitors are deemed to be dominant, i.e., one-third for
one competitor, one-half for three or fewer competitors, and two-thirds for five or
fewer competitors. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (GWB), v.
26.8.1998 (BUNDESGESETZBLATr, TEIL I [BGB1.I] S.2521), as amended v. 2.9.2002
(BGBI. I S.3448, 3670).
21 See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 30-46 (1910) (dis-
cussing the problems with centralization of power and control in the oil industry).
22 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 463 (2d ed. 1985)
(stating that the Sherman Act was in passed only in response to trusts); David
McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 729, 742 (2001) ("Congress passed the [Sherman] Act because Congress
was concerned that large firms or groups of firms were doing bad things.").
23 BORK, supra note 7, at 47 (citing preamble to original Clayton Act bill).
24 This Act was actually passed because of fears of large corporations. See
McGowan, supra note 22, at 750-51 (quoting Representative Cellar saying: "Small,
independent, decentralized business of the kind that built up our country... first,
is fast disappearing, and second, is being made dependent upon monster concentra-
tion. It is very difficult now for the small business to compete against the finan-
cial, purchasing, and advertising power of mammoth corporations;" and Senator
O'Conor saying: "the passage of this bill will go far to curb further growth of mo-
nopoly. In achieving this desirable objective, the interests of small business as an
important competitive factor in the American economy will be advanced") (em-
phasis added).
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the United States was administered mostly under the Sherman
Act.25
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions where "the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly."26 Based on the wording of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, U.S. law thus focuses on the structure
of the market by asking if the merger, independent of whether or
not it creates a dominant position of a single entity, will lead to a
decrease in competition in a market-i.e., whether the merger will
substantially lessen competition (the "SLC test"). In U.S. antitrust law
the position of the individual entity is only considered as evidence
of the concentration of the market. In other words, in the United
States, market concentration is the starting point in a merger con-
trol investigation27-just like the market dominance of one com-
petitor is the starting consideration in Europe. Both systems, as
will be shown below, will subsequently assess the anticompetitive
effect of a merger under their respective but similar tests -and it is
in the application of these tests that the question of the goals of an-
titrust law arises.
The law in the United States (just like in Europe) does not give
a dear guideline as to what the main goal of antitrust law should
be, under what auspices the question of the lessening of competi-
tion should be decided, and what role the interests of both con-
sumers and small and large companies should play.28 A number of
25 Between 1914 and 1950 only fifteen mergers were overturned in the United
States, of which ten were based on the Sherman Act
2 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
27 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines assess concentration in accordance
with the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index ("HHI"). The HHI examines the relation-
ship between the number of competitors and their respective market share in or-
der to determine how concentrated a market is and what change in the index will
occur through a merger. The HI-Il is calculated by summing the squares of the
market shares of each firm in the market A market dominated by few competi-
tors with high market shares leads to a high HHI, indicating a highly concentrated
market, whereas many competitors with relatively small market shares will lead
to a low HII, indicating a low level of concentration. The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines create a presumption of illegality in cases where the HHI is increased
by more than 100 points in markets of 1800 and above, and a presumption of le-
gality if the HEI is either below 1000, or between 1000 and 1800 and the increase
is less than 100. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines 1992 (Apr. 2, 1992) (revised Apr. 8, 1997) [hereinafter
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 19921, para. 1.51, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/hmgl.html.
28 McGowan, supra note 22, at 750.
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different opinions have been offered in the United States as to how
the antitrust law should be interpreted and what the Congressional
intent was in enacting it.29 In this respect, the discussion in the
United States in some ways preceded the one taking place today
between Europe and the United States, especially in the aftermath
of the GE/Honeywell decision.
30
After the enactment of the Sherman Act, there was considerable
opinion in the United States that the interests of small businesses
should play an important role and that it was Congress' intention
to protect those interests from too-mighty market players. The
protagonists and the course of this discussion are well known and
shall only briefly be mentioned here. Justice Rufus Wheeler Peck-
ham, for example, talked about concern for "small dealers and
worthy men."31 His ideas were famously developed further by
Justice Louis Dembritz Brandeis who was willing to balance the
interest of small producers against those of consumers.32 Justice
Learned Hand in his decisions in Alcoa33 and Associated Press34 em-
phasized the situation of the small business vis-A-vis large firms.
The position of the small business against all-mighty competitors
was also advanced famously and in many cases by the Warren
Court in the 1960s.35 Brown Shoe,36 Proctor & Gamble,37 and Von's
29 For a superb discussion of the different historical approaches to antitrust
enforcement, see Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Pro-
spective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, in REVITALIZING
ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, EcoNoMic AND POLITICAL
POLICY 2 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991).
30 William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long
Way from Chicago to Brussels, Address at the George Mason University Sympo-
sium (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public
/speeches/9536.pdf; see also Thomas J. Horton & Stefan Schmitz, A Tale of Two
Continents: The Coming Clash of the Conflicting Viewpoints in Europe and the United
States, ECON. COMM. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law Economics Com-
mittee, Chicago, IL), Spring 2002, at 21-22 (discussing the rekindling of the fun-
damental battle between economic philosophies following the GE/Honeywell"skirmidsh").
31 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,323 (1897).
32 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238-39,241 (1918).
33 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945).
34 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,370-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
35 Cf. Edward T. Swaine, Competition, Not Competitors, Nor Canards: Ways of
Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 597, 603 (discussing "small-is-
beautiful antitrust" litigation in the 1960s).
36 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
37 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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Grocery3S are the most prominent among those cases39 in which the
Supreme Court, while stressing that antitrust law is concerned
with the protection of competition not competitors,40 identified the
desire of Congress "to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses."4' It is therefore probable,
though admittedly somewhat moot and speculative, that the War-
ren Court would also have prohibited GE/Honeywell on similar
grounds as the Commission,42 and would have received the same
type of reaction as it did when it decided its own cases in the 1960s.
The Supreme Court's approach was met with fierce criticism by
judges and academics, starting with, but not limited to, the Univer-
sity of Chicago, in what became the Chicago School. There are two
primary characteristics of the Chicago School. First is the insis-
tence that the exclusive goal of antitrust adjudication is the maxi-
mization of consumer welfare, which must not be weighed against
any other goal, such as the supposed social benefits of preserving
small businesses against superior efficiency. Second, the Chicago-"
ans wanted to apply economic analysis more rigorously.43
The Chicago School gradually made an impact on the Supreme
Court. In 1977, the Court decided the Sylvania case,44 with an
opinion that borrowed liberally from the Chicago School. Sylvania
was not a merger case, but the opinion cast a long shadow over
merger jurisprudence in lower courts because of the implicit en-
dorsement of economic views that also had an application to
33 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
39 According to Robert Bork, these cases are among the worst antitrust essays
ever written, with Brown Shoe having a considerable claim to the title of being
worst of all. BORK, supra note 7, at 210.
40 Timothy J. Muris, in contrast, states that these were the days when the
opinions of the Supreme Court "sought to protect competitors, not competition."
Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68
AiNrRusr L.J. 899 (2001). This statement is a remarkable parallel to the criticism
of the European practice.
41 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at344 (emphasis added).
42 Given the Court's history, this outcome would not be very surprising since
"no merger ever survived the Warren Court's scrutiny." BORK, supra note 7, at
216.
43 Id. at xi. See also Stephen F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of
GTE Sylvania's Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTrrRusr L.J. 945 (2001) ("The significant
contribution of the 'Chicago school' of antitrust has been to demonstrate persua-
sively, through the use of economic theory, how some business activities histori-
cally viewed with suspicion actually benefited consumers and promoted eco-
nomic efficiency.").
44 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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merger law. Most notable was the Court's implicit assumption
that the economic welfare of consumers, rather than other con-
cerns, was the appropriate objective of antitrust. In addition, the
Court was willing to entertain arguments on the efficiency justifi-
cations for business strategies.
The discussion in the United States45 has in the meantime basi-
cally subsided46 and, thus, has paved the way for a more or less
unified position in the United States against the European position.
With the Reagan Revolution in the 1980s, the Chicago School's tri-
umph was completed and U.S. law finally moved away from the
protection of small competitors and toward a focus on consumer
welfare. 47 As recently stated by Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") Chairman Timothy J. Muris, "the focus is clearly on con-
45 FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary talks about the discussion in the
United States as being similar to pendulum swings:
The pendulum is supposed to have swung dramatically from an aggres-
sive enforcement policy in the 1960s and 1970s to a permissive policy in
the Reagan and Bush years (1981-92), followed by a swing back to an ag-
gressive policy in the Clinton years. Other commentators believe that the
pendulum began to swing back during the Bush years, but the persistent
image is one of reaction in the 1980s followed by a strong counter-
reaction in the 1990s.
Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States,
Remarks Made at Guidelines for Merger Remedies: Prospects and Principles, Joint
U.S./EU Conference, Paris, France Gan. 17, 2002), sec. I, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learyuseu.htm.
46 See id. sec. II. B. ("In the last 20 years of close involvement with merger
law-including, most recently, two as a member of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion-I am not aware of a single instance where non-economic factors have
played any part in the ultimate decision of either federal agency."). But also see
the prediction by Thomas Horton and Stefan Schmitz that the discussion will re-
surface by a resurgence of ordoliberalism in Europe. ABA Newsletter, supra note
30, at 23. It is also possible that recent developments such as Enron, WorldCom,
etc., which have proven to be detrimental to consumers, may pave the way for a
more careful approach to large entities and an increased protection of smaller
businesses.
47 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (addressing "consumer
welfare prescription"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Con-
gress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."'). See also
Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and European Merger Policy-Fault Lines and Bridges: Mergers
That Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2002) (manuscript at 7, on file with author) (discussing the changes in antitrust
law after the Reagan Revolution); William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revis-
ited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REv.
1413, 1445 (1990) (explaining that the Reagan Revolution emphasized the en-
hancement of productive and allocative efficiency as the antitrust agencies' exclu-
sive aim).
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sumers, and that debate is over."4 8 Consumer welfare is often
mentioned in connection with efficiencies. 49 "Efficiencies generated
through merger can enhance the merged firm's ability and incen-
tive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved qual-
ity, enhanced service, or new products."50 According to a state-
ment from the 1997 update to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
the FTC and DOJ will assess any efficiency gains that cannot rea-
sonably be achieved by the parties through other means.51
The exact relationship between efficiency and consumer wel-
fare is not clear. Both are often quoted alongside each other as be-
ing the exclusive goal of antitrust law.52 It seems that to the advo-
cates of the Chicago School, "consumer welfare means nothing
more than economic efficiency."5 3 In other words, only efficiencies
that enhance consumer welfare as the ultimate goal of antitrust law
become part of this ultimate goal, which is why it appears that
48 Interview with Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 16 ANTrrRusr 52 (Fall 2001).
49 See Lawrence Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69
ANT usr L.J. 353, 358 (2001) ("[T]he goal is efficiency, not competition. The ul-
timate goal is that there be efficiency.").
50 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992, supra note 27, at4.
51 Id. DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines expressly recognize that efficiencies are
worthy of strong consideration in approving substantial increases of concentra-
tion, and several lower courts have concurred. The Supreme Court most recently
said that the possibility that efficiencies will result from a proposed merger cannot,
be used as a defense to illegality in Clayton Act Section 7 merger cases. See FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Possible economies cannot be
used as a defense to illegality."). Furthermore, the Court has stated that'where the
effect of a merger "may be substantially to lessen competition, [it] is not saved be-
cause, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may
be deemed beneficial." United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
Attempts to pronounce the Supreme Court's reasoning as disproved or outdated
minimize the inexorable waxing and waning of the diametrically opposed socio-
economic belief systems through the decades.
52 See, e.g., Edwin J. Huges, The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and
Mhy It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 265, 269 ("Consumer Welfare as the Exclusive
Goal of Antitrust"). See also id. at 273 ("[Elfficiency is the single goal of the anti-
trust laws.") (1994).
53 Kovacic, supra note 47, at 1448. See also Joint Comments of the American
Bar Association's Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law and
Practice on the Commission's Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation
4064/89 (2001), at 3 [hereinafter ABA Comments] ("[Mierger-generated efficien-
cies should not be held against merging parties. Rather they should typically be
seen as a pro-competitive result of a merger which may benefit consumers and
encourage competitors to become more competitive themselves."), available at
http://www.abanetorg/antitrust/commentsecgreen.doc.
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both terms can be used alongside each other but basically mean the
same thing.
As will be shown, European law acknowledges the importance
of consumer protection, but by far does not award it the position it
has in the United States todaym Currently, it could be said that
European law is dose to where U.S. law was twenty-five years ago,
although this statement should not be interpreted to mean that
European law lags behind. Also, in Europe, efficiencies are not
part of the assessment process itself5s - a fact that is under intense
scrutiny with regard to possible changes of the European regime.5
6
At this time, however, the Commission is at pains to even counter
the impression that there is an efficiencies offense. It could be argued
that through the merger, the newly-formed company would have
an advantage over its competitors, would thus strengthen its com-
petitive position, and would in the long-term drive competitors
who are unable to match the efficiency-driven lower prices out of
business.57 Therefore, it could be argued that efficiencies are bad
54 It is therefore wrong to state that in Europe, the law protects competitors,
not competition. This frequently-heard statement is called a "caricature of EU
law" by Eleanor Fox. Fox, supra note 47, manuscript at 3.
55 Compare Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Mhy the EU Should Not Adopt
the American Efficiency Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures, 44 ST. Louis
L.J. 871, 891 (2000), citing Case 1V/M.53, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991
O.J. (L 334) 42, 4 C.M.L.R. M2 (1992) [hereinafter de Havilland]; Case IV/M.469,
MSG Media Services, 1994 O.J. (L 364) 1, and citing "other Commission decisions"
that take efficiency improvements into account "between the lines." Greaney ar-
gues "efficiencies have played a negligible role in European analyses." However,
in both de Havilland and MSG, the Commission did not allow efficiency consid-
erations to change the outcome of the decision if a dominant position is created or
strengthened. Cf. Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the
European Union: Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 305, 350 (2000) (mention-
ing an argument that merger controls in the EC recognized an expanded efficien-
cies defense). But see Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing
Conglomerate Mergers Across The Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 469 (claiming
that the criticism that the Commission does not recognize an efficiency defense
must be categorically rejected). Giotakos claims that the efficiencies claimed by
the parties in GE/Honeywell were not the type that antitrust authorities have to
rely upon.
56 See Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89,
COM(2001)745 Final [hereinafter ECMR Review Green Paper], paras. 170-72, re-
view (explaining that the Commission is aware if the debate on how, and the ex-
tent to which, efficiencies should be taken into account in competition analysis),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/.
57 Cf. ABA Comments, supra note 53, at 14 ("The Sections are aware of con-
cers... that the creation of efficiencies may reinforce a Commission belief that a
transaction may create or strengthen a dominant position.").
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for competition and should be stopped. Such an allegation of an
efficiency offense has no actual basis in EC law and Commissioner
Monti recently issued a strong statement against this view.58 Inter-
estingly, a similar allegation was made in the United States in the
1960s following a number of FTC decisions that appeared to be
hostile to efficiencies.5 9 Here again, the discussion between U.S.
and European lawyers after GE/Honeywell resembles the one in the
United States in the 1960S.60
3. IMPLEMENTING FREIBURG? THE EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
REGIME
Specific rules on merger control as part of EC law are relatively
new,61 especially when compared to the U.S. merger control rules
enshrined in the 1914 U.S. Clayton Act. It was only in 1990 that the
European Community Merger Control Regulation ("ECMR")62
came into effect.63 Before the enactment of the ECMR, mergers
were dealt with using the general rules of competition law64 as laid
53 Mario Monti, Review of the EC Merger Regulation-Roadmap for the Re-
form Project, Speech before the British Chamber of Commerce in Brussels Ujun. 4,
2002) SPEECH/02/252., available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi
/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=-gt&doc=SPEECH/02/252 10 1 RAPID&lg=EN&disp
lay=.
59 Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743, 776 (1960), affd, Reynolds Metal Co. v.
FTC, 309 F.2d 223,229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Scott Paper Co., 63 F.T.C. 2240,2247-48
(1963); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944,1084 (1962).
60 Cf. Swaine, supra note 35, at 603-04 (suggesting that Europe may still be
learning, as the United States was in the 1960s); Kolasky, supra note 30, at 3 ("Sur-
prisingly, as we enter the 21st century, we find ourselves replaying these old de-
bates on a more global stage.").
61 There was a merger provision in Article 4 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, as amended
Treaties Establishing the European Communities (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987), as it
results from Title Ill of the Treaty Establishing the European Union: Provisions
Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 145, arL H(1)-H(21), although this provision was only applicable to
specific industries. The ECSC Treaty expired on Jul. 23,2002
62 Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 OJ. (L 257) 13, amended by Council
Regulation 1310/97 EC of 30 June, 1997,1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 [hereinafter ECMR].
63 For a history of the European merger control regulation, see RICHARD
WISH, COMPETrTON LAW 735 (4th ed. 2001).
64 See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commis-
sion, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 68 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973) [12] [hereinafter Continental Can]
(employing articles 23, 85, and 86 of the EEC Treaty to judge the legality of a
merger); Case 142/84,156/84, British Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. & R. J. Reynolds In-
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down in EC Articles 81 and 82.65 These articles address concerted
practices and the abuse of a dominant position and parallel Section
1 and Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act on antitrust. Merger con-
trol law and competition law in general on the European continent
cannot claim as long a history as that of similar law in the United
States. To the contrary, only very few countries had a merger con-
trol system established before the ECMR came into effect,66 and
even general competition law has only recently been enacted in
many countries.67 This fact must not be underestimated because it
shows that there is less, if any, tradition of administering antitrust
and merger control rules outside of the United States, where these
rules have been part of the law for a century. 68
dus. Inc. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R 4487, 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1986) (considering the
legality of a merger in light of Articles 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty).
65 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, May 1, 1999, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 173 (Consolidated Version). This is the Treaty of Rome, 1957, as amended by
the Single European Act, 1986, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union,
1992, and by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts,
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. In accordance with the practice of the European
Court of Justice, articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Community as it
stands after May 1, 1999 will be cited using "EC," whereas articles of the Treaty
before that date will be cited using "of the EC-Treaty."
66 The United Kingdom first introduced merger control in the Monopolies
and Mergers Act of 1965. Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, c. 50 (Eng.). Ger-
many added merger control provisions to its Act Against Restraints of Competi-
tion in 1973. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen (GWB), v. 4.4.1974
(BGBI. I S.917). France introduced merger control in 1986. Ordinance No. 86-1243
of December 1, 1986, J.O. Dec. 9, 1986, p. 14,773; Dalloz-Sirey, Ligislation [D.S.L.]
1987, 3 modified by Law No. 96-588 of July 1, 1996, J.O. 1996, p. 9983; D.S.L. 1996,
295.
67 Germany took the lead in Europe by introducing a so-called cartel regula-
tion in 1923, i.e., more than thirty years after the Sherman Act Verordnung gegen
den Missbrauch wirtschaftlicher Machtstellung, v. 2.11.1923 (REICHSGESETZBLATT,
TEIL I [RGB1. I] S. 1067) (Order Against the Abuse of Economic Power). The Ger-
man example was, however, not followed by other European countries. The
situation in the United Kingdom was somewhat different. Although it introduced
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act as late as 1948, the Common Law
doctrine of restraints of trade is much older and has roots as far back as the Mid-
dle Ages. TIM FRAZER, MONOPOLY COMPETITION AND THE LAW 112-24 (2d ed. 1992).
This law also had, as the following note shows, considerable influence on U.S.
law.
68 Competition law was actually applied prior to that date, through reliance
on principles of Common Law. Senator Sherman himself, when introducing the
new legislation, stated that the act bore nothing new but only "applies old and
well recognized principles of the common law." 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890). In
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-62 (1910), the Supreme Court con-
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Under the ECMR, all (and only) concentrations with a "Com-
munity Dimension" fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
European authorities as opposed to that of one or more national
authorities.69 Having established a Community Dimension, the
substantive test under the ECMR asks whether a merger is "com-
patible with the Common Market."
3.1. Concentration with a Community Dimension
A concentration has a Community Dimension if the partici-
pating undertakings pass the turnover70 threshold laid down in
ECMR Article 1. There are two scenarios in which a Community
Dimension can be established: first, a concentration has a Com-
munity Dimension if the combined annual worldwide turnover of
all undertakings concerned exceeds E5 billion (currently $5 billion)
and if the European Community-wide turnover of each of at least
two undertakings concerned is more than £250 million.71 In the
case of GE/Honeywell, for example, this threshold was easily
passed.72 The second threshold was introduced in 19977 to control
mergers where a much lower turnover is involved, but the turn-
over is generated by a larger number of companies who are active
in a larger number of Member States.74 In order for a concentration
to have a Community Dimension, more than two-thirds of the
Community-wide turnover of the undertakings concerned may not
sidered the situation before the passage of the Sherman Act at length, referring
specifically to the law in England.
69 According to Article 22(1), ECMR concentrations, whether they are of
Community Dimension or not, are exclusively dealt with by the ECMR while the
rules of general competition law do not apply. However, if a joint venture quali-
fies as a concentration within the meaning of ECMR Article 3, it can be assessed
under general competition laws if it does not meet the revenue criteria for a
Community Dimension. ECMR, supra note 62-
70 European law uses the word "turnover" which corresponds to "revenues"
in American English.
7' ECMR, supra note 62, art. 1(2)(a)-(b).
72 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 7.
73 ECMR, supra note 62.
74 It provides that for a Community Dimension, the combined annual
worldwide revenue of all subsidiaries is more than £2-5 billion; plus at least two
subsidiaries have an EU Community-wide revenue of more than E100 million;
plus the combined revenue in each of at least three Member States exceeds £100
million; plus in each of at least three of these Member States revenue exceeds £25
million for at least two subsidiaries. ECMR, supra note 62, art. 1(3)(a)-(d).
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be generated in a single Member State ("2/3 rule").75 The ECMR
thus aims at ensuring that only (and, if possible, all) truly "multi-
national mergers" will be dealt with on an EC level, while those
that concern the markets in the Member States will only be as-
sessed by the competent national authorities. 76 For multinational
mergers, the ECMR awards its greatest benefit, the "one-stop-shop
principle," by which it ensures that any other national jurisdiction
within the EC need not be notified of the mergers, no matter how
much effect they may have in these jurisdictions. Of course,
authorities outside the EC may still have to be notified of the
mergers, but, with just one investigation, the ECMR can grant legal
certainty for the whole of Western Europe. 77
75 See the last sentences of Article 1(2) and Article 1(3) of the ECMR. ECMR,
supra note 62, art. 1(2)-(3).
76 Many international mergers, whether they are among European companies
or not, are still not reported to the Commission because they do not reach the nec-
essary threshold for Community jurisdiction despite their international character.
Therefore, these mergers do not enjoy the "one-stop-shop" principle and need to
be reported to a number of national authorities instead. As mentioned, of all the
mergers in Europe that required clearance, the Commission was only notified of
about 11%; the rest were reported to one or more national authorities. Merger
control in Europe is therefore far from homogeneous and all-encompassing. The
Commission, in its 2000 Report on the application of the Merger Regulation
Thresholds, concluded that too many transactions with significant cross-border
effects, and therefore a Community interest, remain outside of the Community's
merger control rules. ECMR Review Green Paper, supra note 56, 2-3. In order to
overcome this shortcoming, the Commission suggests a review of the existing
revenue thresholds as well as other substantive and procedural rules relating to
the control of concentrations, such as the 2/3 rule. It is therefore likely that either
the existing thresholds will be lowered or a completely new threshold covering
certain cross-border concentrations will be introduced. Such a new threshold
would be lower than the existing ones and would either be combined with a
modified 2/3 rule or would completely abandon such a rule. The-Commission
initiated a comprehensive discussion on the thresholds in its Green Paper on the
Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89. ECMR Review Green Paper
supra note 56.
77 It must not be overlooked that the Commission also has jurisdiction in
cases where the European Economic Area ("EEA") is concerned. On May 2,1992,
the EEC, the ECSC, and the then-twelve Member States of the European Union
reached an agreement with the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") States
for the establishment of an EEA that came into force on January 1, 1994 ("EEA-
Treaty"). Treaty on the European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 245 (1992). The aim of this agreement was to create a homogeneous eco-
nomic area in Europe, including the states that had not yet joined the European
Union. The agreement also attempted to unify competition law rules. By model-
ing its own rules on those of the EC Treaty, the EEA-Treaty effectively extended
the EU competition rules to the participating EFTA States. Of the remaining
EFTA Members, only Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway participate in the EEA,
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By contrast, under the size-of-the-parties test of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,78 a merger has to be
reported if one party has annual net sales or assets of at least $10
million worldwide and the other has annual net sales or total assets
of at least $100 million. Not surprisingly, the U.S. authorities re-
ceive a much greater number of notifications every year than the
Commission.79
3.2. The Material Test: Compatibility with the Common Market
The theoretical background for the material test that is applied
in Europe has already been outlined above. As mentioned, Euro-
pean law focuses on the dominance of a newly merged entity. This
principle is enshrined in ECMR Article 2(2), which states that a
concentration that does not create or strengthen market dominance,
whereby effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market or in a substantial part of it,80 shall be declared
compatible with the common market.
with Switzerland abstaining. EEA-Treaty Article 53 was modeled on EC Article
81; EEA-Treaty Article 54 parallels EC Article 82. Most importantly, according to
EEA-Treaty Article 57, the rules of the ECMR effectively apply to the EEA. The
EEA-Treaty also established its own authority, the EFTA Surveillance Authority
("ESA"), and an EFTA Court. However, whenever trade with the EC is affected to
an appreciable extent, the Commission has jurisdiction under the EEA-Treaty
(Article 56(1)(c) and 56(3)).
7 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994).
79 In 2000, the Commission reviewed 345 mergers, while its Washington
counterparts reviewed 4926. Jean Eaglesham & Francesco Guerrera, Brussels
(Tougher than U.S. on Merger Control), FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2002, at 9. During this
time, the national authorities within the EU received 3021 notifications. ECMR
Review Green Paper, supra note 56, at n. 1.
80 The ways in which the European and U.S. authorities define the relevant
markets do not vary much from each other. Cf. Kauper, supra note 55, at 329
(noting that there is little difference between market definition under the Euro-
pean Merger Regulation and the Clayton Act); David Snyder, Mergers and Acquisi-
tions in the European Community and the United States: A Movement Toward a Uni-
form Enforcement Body?, 29 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 115, 125-26 (1997) (noting that
in both the United States and the Commission of the European Community, the
determination of the relevant market depends on "demand-side substitutability").
The Commission describes the relevant product market as comprising "all those
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable
by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their
intended use." Commission Regulation 447/98 of I March 1998 on the Notifica-
tions, Time Limits, and Hearings Provided for in Council Regulation 4064/89 on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Section 6,1998 O.J. (L 61) 1,
18 [hereinafter Form CO]. See also Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission,
1978 E.C.R. 207,226; [197812 C.M.L.R. 429,483-84 [hereinafter United Brands] (de-
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3.2.1. Creation or Strengthening of Dominance
fining the relevant product market as the fresh fruit market because these fruits
were reasonably interchangeable by consumer. Interestingly, this did not apply to
bananas, which the court considered, for a number of reasons, to be sufficiently
distinct from the other fresh fruit markets.) Id. para. 35; Continental Can, supra
note 64, at 235 (noting that the relevant product market is determined by a prod-
uct's interchangeability with other products). The relevant product market thus
includes those products and services that a significant number of consumers
would accept as a substitute if the price of the original product were increased
("demand-side substitution").
The degree of price increases the European Commission used in the so-called
SSNIP Test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price Test) is 5% to
10%. See Commission Notice 97/C 372/03 of 12 September 1997 on the Definition
of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997
O.J. (C 372) 5 para. 17 (setting forth a 5% to 10% range in price increase as indica-
tive of interchangeability). See also Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992, supra note
27, para. 1.11 ("[Tlhe Agency at times may use a price increase that is larger or
smaller than five percent"). If this price increase prompts consumers to purchase
a large enough amount of another product instead, then both products are con-
sidered to be part of the same product market. In some cases, the market may
also be considered from the supply side. If, on short notice, a supplier is able to
switch its production to supply another good or service to meet demand when
prices rise significantly, the alternative product is to be considered part of the
same product market ("supply-side substitution"). Continental Can, supra note
64, at 248. Similarly, in the United States, the relevant product market is defined
by reference to demand-side substitution. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992) (stating that the relevant market for antitrust
purposes is determined by the "commercial realities" faced by consumers); Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines 1992, supra note 27, para. 1.11 ("[T]he Agency will de-
lineate the product market to be a product or group of products such that a hy-
pothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of
those products ('monopolist') likely would impose at least 'a small but significant
and nontransitory' increase in price.").
The Commission first defines the relevant geographic market as the areas
where the parties to the merger are active. Case IV/31.851, Magill TV Guide/ITP;
BBC and RTE v. Commission, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 48; Case WV/29877, British Tele-
comm. v. Commission, 1982 Oj. (L 360) 36. A secondary definition is provided by
the area in which the above-mentioned substitution could take place: where the
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and can be distinguished
from neighboring areas because conditions there are considerably different See
Case IV/M.1069, WorldCom/MCI v. Commission, 1999 Oj. (L 116) 1, paras. 80-82
(discussing the relevant geographic market for internet service providers). In the
United States, the geographic market is defined as the area in which the seller op-
erates and to which buyers can practicably turn for supplies. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines 1992, supra note 27, para. 1.2. See also United States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359-61 (1963) (noting that the relevant geographic market is
determined by the area where the seller operates and the buyer can turn for sup-
plies); T. Harris Young & Assoc. v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th
Cir. 1991) ("The geographic dimension is the area in which the product or its rea-
sonably interchangeable substitutes are traded.").
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The ECMR (or for that matter any other EC document) does not
contain a clear-cut definition of what constitutes a dominant posi-
tion. For its assessment, the Commission relies on the established
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
("ECJ") on EC Article 82, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant
positionP and thus parallels Section 2 of the Sherman Act.82 Ac-
cording to the ECJ, the test to determine a dominant position is
whether the economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking enables
it to "prevent effective competition being maintained on the rele-
vant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately
its consumers."8 3 The adoption of EC Article 82 for the determina-
tion of dominance in EC law is not without problems because the
case law of the Eq regarding this provision deals with the existing
position of an undertaking in the market and whether or not this
position is dominant and being abused. In contrast, the merger in-
vestigation is concerned with the position that arises through a
merger and the question of whether it will create or strengthen a
dominant position. Since it is not known how a proposed merger
will actually evolve, this assessment necessarily involves a large
degree of speculation.8 4 In comparison, under U.S. law, a firm
81 See Sergio Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European Un-
ion: How Should the United States' Experience Influence the Enforcement of the Council
Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 223, 272 (1997) (arguing that the
"Commission should, in its merger analysis, equally consider both industry policy
concerns and strict competition-based factors"); Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Dif-
fering U.S. and E.U. Positions on the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding An-
other Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 825, 850 (1999) ("The Commission has
used [the] 'significant impediment' test to add some flexibility in the merger
analysis....").
82 This parallel must not be overemphasized since Section 2 of the Sherman
Act requires a monopoly, whereas EC Article 82 lets a dominant position suffice.
Cf. Kauper, supra note 55, at 321 ("The thresholds for finding a dominant position
under [current Article 82] may be significantly lower than the measures df mo-
nopoly power under section two of the Sherman Act").
83 United Brands, supra note 80, at 286. The court used the same formula in
Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (1979)
[hereinafter Hoffmann-La Roche].
84 Cf. Donald Baker, Antitrust Merger Review in an Era of Escalating Cross-
Border Transactions and Effects, 18 WIs. INT'L L.J. 577, 579 (2000) ("Even merger re-
view based on straight antitrust judgments still involves recurring questions on
which it is often difficult to make anything like an uncontradicted judgment").
This is also true for the significant lessening of competition ("SLC") approach and
reflects the general situation of merger control which is based on an ex-ante ap-
praisal.
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must have "the power to control prices or exclude competition" to
be considered dominant85
The most important factor, but by no means the only one, in
determining whether or not a dominant position exists, is market
share. In order to determine whether a merger should proceed, the
Commission must consider the market share that would be created
by the merger. Again, neither under EC Article 82 nor in the
ECMR are there hard and fast rules for the level of market share
the Commission uses to identify market dominance.8 6 The ECMR
itself states that a combined market share of 25% should, in all
likelihood, not impede effective competition 7 and is thus to be re-
garded as compatible with the Common Market.88 In a number of
cases the Commission held that market shares between 50% and
60% were incompatible with the Common Market.8 9 The Commis-
sion has also ruled that, under certain circumstances, a share of as
low as 44% is incompatible.90 On the other hand, the Commission
has granted permission to proceed to a company that had a market
share of more than 80%.91 This emphasis on market share in the
85 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956).
86 In comparison, for example, German merger control rules provide for a re-
buttable presumption of dominance if one competitor has a market share of more
than 1/3, or if two or three competitors have a share of more than 1/2, or if four
or five have a 2/3 market share. In the United Kingdom, an undertaking with a
market share of more than one half is presumed to be dominant. Cf. Monti, supra
note 4, at 3 (noting that the EU Commission does not use any particular concen-
tration ratio to establish presumptions).
87 ECMR, supra note 62, pmbl. no. 15. Apart from the fact that the wording of
this provision seems to suggest that the 25% threshold should not be regarded as
a firm threshold, it must also be remembered that the recitals are not legally
binding, but rather are merely used for interpreting the regulation.
8 Interestingly, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364
(1963), the Supreme Court found that a 30% market share was sufficient to give
rise to the presumption of illegality. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines as-
sume that adverse unilateral price effects are most likely to occur when the parties
to a merger have a market share of at least 35%. Horizontal Merger Guidelines
1992, supra note 27, para. 2.211.
89 See, e.g., Case IV/M.553, RTL/Veronica/Endemol, 1996 O.J. (L 134) 32
(holding that a proposed merger with at least a 60% forecasted market share
would result in an entity with a dominant position in the Dutch television adver-
tising market).
90 Case IV/M.754, Anglo American Corp./Lonrho, 1998 O.J. (L 149) 21.
91 Case IV/MO.42, Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 48. See also Barry E.
Hawk et al., Recent Developments in EU Merger Control, 15 ANTITRUST 24, 24 (2001)
("One of the longest standing 'hornbook' principles of EC competition law has
been that single-firm dominance is unlikely to exist unless a (combined) firm has a
relevant market share exceeding 40 percent").
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assessment of a dominant position is problematic. To begin with, it
is questionable whether the market share figures of one company
can simply be added to those of another after or because of the
merger.92 Difficulties in implementing the merger may result in
some of this share being lost to competitors. The decision to block
a merger could thus quickly be overtaken by events that, ex post,
render the decision wrong. If the European system were based
solely on market share, this would constitute a fatal weakness.
However, in almost all cases, market share is only the starting
point. The Commission looks at various other factors for estab-
lishing market dominance. Market share alone is sufficient to es-
tablish market dominance in only a few cases. The most obvious
case is a market share of 100%, which would put the incumbent in
a position to act completely independently of customers and com-
petitors.
The aforementioned problems have also played a role in the
discussion in the United States, where they led to the demise of the
importance of individual party market share in analyzing merg-
ers.93 In 1974, the Supreme Court held in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp. that the statistical data about the market and mar-
ket shares relied upon by the government were not conclusive in-
dicators of anti-competitive effects94-thus effectively killing the
market share presumption for illegality.95 Only a further examina-
tion of the particular market-its structure, history, and probable
future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the prob-
able anti-competitive effect of the merger.
When assessing whether a merger is compatible with the
Common Market, ECMR Article 2(1) prescribes that the Commis-
sion shall take into account the following mandatory factors:
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition
within the common market in view of, among other things,
the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or
potential competition from undertakings located either
within or outwith the Community;
92 Moreover, this type of addition can only be done in cases where the merg-
ing parties are active in horizontal markets. Market share necessarily plays a
much less prominent role in cases of vertical mergers.
93 Kauper, supra note 55, at 323.
94 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,498 (1974).
95 Kauper, supra note 55, at 323.
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(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and
their economic and financial power, the alternatives avail-
able to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or mar-
kets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and de-
mand trends for the relevant goods and services, the
interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and
the development of technical and economic progress pro-
vided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form
an obstacle to competition.96
While it seems that ECMR Article 2(1)(b) merely reiterates gen-
eral concerns of merger control to consider as a matter of course,
the factors in (b) are more specific and require careful attention. It
is not completely clear how these criteria can be applied to the ac-
tual decision-making process and, in particular, how they relate to
the criterion for establishing an impediment to competition. Since
the factors must be considered when appraising compatibility with
the Common Market and not merely when assessing the dominant
position or the impediment to competition, it would appear that
these factors must be applied after the aforementioned criteria are
met. However, in practice, these factors are mostly used to estab-
lish dominance, as was the case in GE/Honeywell.
Previous case law suggests that the Commission has empha-
sized certain aspects such as superior technology,97 access to capi-
tal,98 vertical integration, a well-developed distribution system,99
product differentiation, 100 overall size and strength,101 conduct, 02
and performance 03 and has been less concerned with other aspects;
There has also been emphasis on the general structure of the mar-
96 ECMR, supra note 62, art. 2(1).
97 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commis-
sion, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3536, 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (1985) [hereinafter Michelin]; United
Brands, supra note 80, at 276.
98 Continental Can, supra note 64.
99 Hoffmann-La Roche, supra note 83, at 524; United Brands, supra note 80, at
276.
100 United Brands, supra note 80, at 276.
101 Michelin, supra note 97, at 3536.
102 United Brands, supra note 80, at 277.
103 Case IV/F-3/33.708, British Sugar v. Commission, 1999 O.J. (L 76) 1., para.
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kets involved.104 This can mean that a market share figure can be
harmless in one case, but can result in market dominance in an-
other,105 depending on the number of competitors and their market
shares.106 In its decision to establish dominance in GE/Honeywell,
the Commission went to great lengths in addressing the issues of
access to capital, vertical integration, overall size and strength, and
previous conduct. As already mentioned, it did not do so under a
separate heading, but in its overall assessment, together with the
questions of dominance and impediment to competition.
The interesting issue, and of importance in the case of
GE/Honeywell, is the interests of intermediate and ultimate con-
sumers as set forth in ECMR Article 2(1)(b). However, so far, this
provision has had no relevance in practice.107 As mentioned ear-
lier, this does not mean that consumer welfare plays no role in
European merger control. It simply means that while the provision
of ECMR Article 2(1)(b) has so far not been applied expressly as
such, consumer welfare has nevertheless been part of the overall
assessment.
3.2.2. Impediment to Competition
An interesting and often overlooked question in European
merger control is whether the ECMR effectively calls for a two-tier
test to determine whether a merger is compatible with the Com-
mon Market-and thus actually departs from the classic market
dominance approach. If this were the case, the current discussion
could be slightly off the mark and would be a more historical dis-
cussion about the traditional European model, rather than a dis-
cussion about the ECMR vis-A-vis the U.S. System. The wording of
ECMR Article 2(2) and (3) ("create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion as a result of which effective competition would be signifi-
cantly impeded") appears to suggest that there is in fact a two-tier
test- dominant position plus significant impediment to competi-
tion, whereby the latter is a consequence of the first. It has been
104 Michelin, supra note 97, at 3461.
105 WHiSH, supra note 63, at 155.
106 See discussion supra note 27.
107 Cf. HEINZ F. LOFFLER, FKVO Artikel 2, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM DETJrSCHEN
UND EUROPAISCHEN KARTELLRECHT para. 165 (Eugen Langen & Hermann-Josef
Bunte eds., 9th ed. 2001); Opi, supra note 81, at 231 ("Thus despite the Merger
Regulation's reference to consumers' interests, in practice, these interests are
rarely taken into account").
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
562 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [23:3
argued-mostly by German writers' 08-that the impediment to
competition is a natural consequence of the first (and thus only)
test of dominant market position,109 and therefore has no substance
of its own." 0 The Commission, however, seems to follow a two-
tier approach. In Aerospatiale -Alenia/de Havilland,"' it explained
that market dominance is not enough to establish incompatibility
with the common market:
[A] concentration which leads to the creation of a dominant
position may however be compatible with the common
market within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Merger
Regulation if there exists strong evidence that this position
108 This is not surprising given their dogmatic background, which relies
purely on market dominance.
109 Sir Leon Brittan, once the EC Competition Commissioner, stated "You
may ask whether a dominant position without the effect of impeding competition
is at all conceivable. I think that in most cases it is not." Stock, supra note 81, at
852
110 L6ffler, supra note 107, paras. 9, 174; Ulrich Immenga, FKVO Artikel 2, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EUROPAISCHEN KARTELLRECHT para. 18 (Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-
Joachim Mestmacker eds., 2d ed. 1997). The Bundeskartellamt also appears to
subscribe to this view. See Bundeskartellamt, Prohibition Criteria in Merger Control-
Dominant Position Versus Substantial Lessening of Competition? Antitrust Workshop,
Discussion Paper, Oct. 8-9, 2001 (arguing that there are "no convincing reasons for
changing the prohibition criterion in European or German Merger Control from
the MD test to the SLC test"), available at http://www
.bundeskartellamt.de/discussion-papers.html. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon lawyers
in Europe favor the existence of a two-tier test that would bring European law
closer to U.S. law. See C. W. BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF
COMPETITION para. 6-062 (Vivien Rose ed., 4th ed. 1993) (noting that applying the
second tier of the test would introduce "a degree of flexibility to the Commis-
sion's appraisal which would be lacking if it were required solely to apply the
dominance test"); C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL 128-29 (3d ed.
2000) ("The requirement that the dominant position must significantly impede
competition in practice is a two-part composite test, and is a formulation broadly
consistent with existing case law under Article 82."); ALISON JONES & BRENDA
SMITH, EC COMsr'ioN LAW 752 (2001) (arguing strongly for a two-tier test);
WHISH, supra note 63, at 773 (considering whether articles 2(2) and 2(3) create one
or two tests); Stock, supra note 81, at 850 ("The Commission has used [the] 'signifi-
cant impediment' test to add some flexibility in the merger analysis.. . ."). Inter-
estingly, the German government also argued for the existence of a second crite-
rion in the Kali und Salz case. Joined Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95, French Republic v.
Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, para. 106, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829 (1998), para. 106
[hereinafter Kali und Salz].
111 de Havilland, supra note 55.
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is only temporary and would be quickly eroded because of
high probability of strong market entry"12
In MCI WorldCoi/Sprint, the first U.S. merger blocked by the
Commission," 3 the Commission first identified the dominant posi-
tion and then continued by expressly asking what the impact of the
merger would be on competition." 4 A similar approach was taken
in AlliedSignaI/Honeywell in which the Commission expressly stated
that the merger would not create a significant impediment to com-
petitiorLn5 The ECJ also seems to have subscribed to this view. In
Kali und Salz, the court acknowledged the existence of a second test
by saying that:
The introduction of that criterion is intended to ensure that
the existence of a causal link between the concentration and
the deterioration of the competitive structure of the market
can be excluded only if the competitive structure resulting
from the concentration would deteriorate in similar fashion
even if the concentration did not proceed." 6
The approach of the Commission and the Court, while ob-
scurely phrased, deserves support. The wording of ECMR Article
2, which in itself is fairly dear in identifying a second test, would
not make sense if this test had no meaning of its own.
112 Id. para. 53. In other words, the fact that market dominance had been es-
tablished was not sufficient to prohibit the merger. A similar decision was made
in Case IV/M.222, Mannesmann/Hoesch v. Commission, 1993 O.J. (L 114) 34.
113 There are a number of factors that make the MCI WorldCom/Sprint case
different from GE/Honeywell. For one, the deal did not receive the blessing of the
U.S. authorities before the Commission reached a negative verdict
114 Case COMP/M.1741, MCI WorldCom/Sprint v. Commission (2000),
paras. 129-74, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers
/cases/decisions/ml741_en.pdf. The parties had actually argued before the FCC
that the merger would have no impact on competition in which case, according to
the two-tier approach, the Commission would have cleared the merger. How-
ever, the Commission did not accept this argument as it consequently denied
clearance.
115 Case COMP/M.1601, AlliedSignal/Honeywell v. Commission (1999) para.
113 [hereinafter AlliedSignal], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/competiion/mergers/cases/index/by. nr m.32.html#m1601.
116 Kali und SaIz, supra note 110, para. 115.
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A two-tier test, as described, effectively means a departure
from the classical emphasis on market dominance and introduces a
correction that brings the European test closer to the one in the
United States. This would be even more the case if, within the
evaluation of whether an impediment of competition occurs,
Europe were to accept efficiencies and the role of consumer wel-
fare. Market dominance is only the first test or starting point of an
investigation, similar to the HHI test in the United States. Only
once this test has been passed will the real substantive antitrust as-
sessment begin, looking at the actual effects on competition, as in
the United States. Suddenly, the two systems will no longer seem
so different from each other. However, the substantive assessment
in Europe ("impediment to competition") focuses substantially on
a certain understanding of how the market should look (see the
reference to the structure of the markets that need to be appraised
under ECMR Article 2(1)(a))j 7 This is where the differences be-
tween the two systems surface again. In Europe, at least currently,
the structural goal is a diversified market with as many players as
possible and no dominant competitor.118 In the United States, on
the other hand, the assessment focuses on consumer welfare.
If the two-tier test is applied, apart from the question of im-
pediment, two further tests need to be passed, as prescribed by the
language of ECMR Articles 2(2) and (3). First, a causal link must
exist between the negative effect and the dominant position ("as a
result of which"). Second, the impediment to competition must be
significant. This introduces a de minimis rule that wouldalow for
small infringements. The two-tier test would thus give the Com-
mission more flexibility to deal with mergers, since market domi-
nance alone does not automatically render a merger impossible.119
In the case of GE/Honeywell, the question of whether the sub-
stantive test under the ECMR is one- or two-tiered played, or, more
accurately, should have played, an important part in the decision.
Adhering to the two-tier test, the Commission, after having estab-
117 ECMR, supra note 62, art. 2(1)(a).
118 Market dominance would come into play at this point again and would
thus play a dual role: entry criterion for the commencement of an investigation
plus aspect for determination of impediment of competition. The important dif-
ference to a true MD interpretation therefore is that market dominance of one firm
does not automatically lead to a prohibition of the market but is merely a factor,
albeit an important one, in determining the legality of a merger.
119 See Stock, supra note 81, at 850 ("Market share data that results in a finding
of a 'dominant position' does not end the legal inquiry.").
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lished market dominance, should have continued by showing that
the proposed merger would bring about anti-competitive effects.
This would have necessitated a very thorough analysis of the eco-
nomic impact and consequences of the merger -the alleged failure
of which was one of the main points of criticism from the United
States. The steps the Commission took in GE/Honeywell were less
straightforward. Instead of first establishing dominance under one
heading and then assessing the question of impediment to compe-
tition under another, the Commission addressed both aspects to-
gether and included the mandatory factors in its assessment.120
4. THE DECISION IN GE/HONEYWELL
By mid-2000, U.S. giants GE and Honeywell entered into nego-
tiations for a possible merger or, to be more precise, a takeover of
the latter by the former. On October 22, 2000, the parties signed an
agreement pursuant to which GE agreed to acquire the entire share
capital of Honeywell for a purchase price of $42 billion. Thus
Honeywell would have become a wholly owned subsidiary of
GE.121 The parties notified the DOJ of the proposed merger in Oc-
tober 2000, and notified the Commission four months later.122
4.1. The Decision in the United States
Under U.S. law the decision to block a merger can only be
made by a court and not the investigating authority (i.e., the FTC
or DO). The DOJ or the FTC "only" decides whether to take the
merger to court to get it blocked. In the proposed merger of GE
and Honeywell, the DOJ decided not to take this step. Tradition-
ally, the DOJ does not publish the reasons why it has decided not
to litigate a matter. However, in the case of the merger between
GE and Honeywell, the DOJ adopted an extraordinary position
and explained its decision.123 This was partly due to criticism that
120 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 341-458.
121 An interesting aspect of the merger is that it was hoped the merger would
achieve savings of up to $1.5 billion through efficiency initiatives and productivity
measures. See JACK WELCH, STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 362 (2001).
122 The Commission was notified of the merger on February 5, 2001. Com-
mission, Prior Notification of a Concentration (Case COMP/M.2220 -General
Electric/Honeywell), 2001 O.J. (C 46) 6.
2 This was done in a DOJ submission for the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate
Mergers. Dep't of Justice, Range Effects: The United States Perspective (Oct 12,
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the Department's investigation lacked necessary diligence-espe-
cially when compared to the Commission's extensive investigation
and subsequent lengthy written decision.124
In its investigation, the DOJ identified two key markets that
would have been affected by the merger: the market for military
helicopter engines and the market for providing heavy mainte-
nance, repair, and overhaul ("MRO") services for aircraft engines
and auxiliary power units ("APU"). This finding is interesting be-
cause the Commission identified completely different markets,
most prominently those of avionics and jet aircraft engines, as be-
ing at the heart of its decision.
With regard to the first market, GE and Honeywell are the two
premier manufacturers of U.S. military helicopter engines, collec-
tively accounting for a substantial majority of all engines powering
military helicopters flying today.125 The DOJ found that the merger
would have substantially lessened competition in the production
of U.S. helicopter engines, which could consequently expose the
U.S. military to higher prices, lower quality, and reduced innova-
tion in the design, development, and production of the next gen-
eration of advanced U.S. military helicopter engines.126 In order to
remedy this concern, the DOJ required the parties to divest Hon-
eywell's helicopter engine business, which had generated revenues
of $200 million in 2000.127
With regard to the second market, the DOJ feared that, as a
likely result of the strong and combined position of the merged
company, a range of commercial business aircraft users would
likely have suffered increased prices and reduced quality in the re-
pair and overhaul of Honeywell aircraft engines and APUs.128 The
DOJ therefore required the parties to authorize a new third-party
MRO service provider for certain models of Honeywell's aircraft
2001) [hereinafter OECD Submission], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr
/public/intemational/9550.pdf.
124 Kolasky, supra note 30, at 8-9.
125 They also received virtually all of the applicable research and develop-
ment funding provided by the U.S. Department of Defense through its Joint Tur-
bine Advanced Gas Generator Program. Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department
Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2001/8140
.htm.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Press Release, DOJ, supra note 125.
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engines and APUs in order to introduce a new player in this mar-
ket and thus allow for more competition. With these conditions
implemented, the DOJ expressed the view that competition in both
markets "will continue to flourish" and, on May 2, 2001, reached
the appropriate agreement with the parties.129
4.2. The Case Before the Commission
4.2.1. History
The Commission had knowledge of the proposed merger at the
time notice was given to the U.S. authorities, and it is very likely
that it was involved in talks with the parties from that point for-
ward.1 30 However, the Commission was not formally notified of
the merger proposal until February 2001. This was not only four
months after the notification in the United States, but probably also
after the DOJ had indicated that it would allow the deal to go
through. GE could have hoped that the U.S. decision would put
pressure on the European authorities to approve the deal as well.131
However, the first setback occurred on March 1, 2001, when the
Commission decided to open a full investigation into the merger.132
This was an alarming sign, since about 95% of all cases do not
M Id.
130 U.S. Assistant Attorney General Charles James, in a speech before the
OECD Global Competition Forum in Paris, stated that the Commission had been
informed and involved in the discussions throughout the U.S. investigation. U.S.
Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, Address Before the OECD Global
Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf. Competition Commissioner Mario Monti denied
this fact, saying that "he had 'some useful telephone conversations' with Mr.
James in the days beforehand, but that it was 'unfortunately impossible to have
any discussions at all at the very highest policy level.'" John Deq. Briggs & How-
ard Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath of GE/Honeywell, 16 ANTrrRusr
26,28 (2001).
131 The parties approached both authorities at the same time, in early No-
vember 2000, to discuss the competition problems. However, it is said that it took
GE and Honeywell a very long time to prepare Form CO to the satisfaction of the
MT. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 22 ("It was not until early Febru-
ary 2001, about the same time that the parties went into substantial compliance
with the Second Request in the United States, that the MTF staff agreed that the
Form CO was complete and could be filed.").
132 See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Opens Full Inves-
tigation into the General Electric/Honeywell Merger (Feb. 3, 2001) ("[T]he Com-
mission will make a detailed assessment of the impact of the transaction on com-
petition ... ."), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?reslist.
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reach this stage. In its decision, the Commission reasoned that the
first phase of the investigation indicated that the merger might
bring about horizontal overlaps in the market for large regional jet
engines, which would significantly reduce the existing degree of
competition in this market. In the Commission's view, there were
also vertical effects "to the extent that Honeywell [was] a supplier
of components to competing engine manufacturers."133 Further-
more, there were conglomerate effects "stemming from the possi-
ble bundling of jet engines, avionics and non-avionics [that were]
likely to foreclose competition in these markets."34
On May 8, 2001, the Commission sent GE a 155-page statement
of objection to the deal, which reflected continuing concerns about
the markets likely to be affected by the potential merger of the two
companies. The statement, a dear indication of the upcoming dif-
ficulties, invited the parties to strengthen their efforts to reach an
agreement with the Commission and stated that the merger would
not be allowed in its current form. On June 14, 2001, GE and Hon-
eywell responded to the Commission's concerns with a package of
measures. When the Commission signaled that it did not consider
the offers of GE and Honeywell sufficient, the parties withdrew
their offer and submitted a new and substantially modified set of
measures on June 28, 2001.135 This again proved unsuccessful, and
after intensive last minute negotiations, on July 3, 2001, the Com-
mission formally decided to block the merger.
4.2.2. The Reasoning of the Commission
In contrast to the DOJ, the Commission was not concerned
about the market for helicopters and MRO services. Their lack of
concern about this issue is not surprising; this market had very lit-
tle effect on the Common Market, and the DOJ investigation had
already addressed and remedied the problem. Rather, the Com-
mission identified a number of other affected markets. The most
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 This submission was actually inadmissible because Article 18(2) of Regu-
lation 447/98 of March 1, 1998 on the Notifications, Time Limits and Hearings,
states that commitments intended by the parties to form the basis of a decision of
compatibility have to be submitted within three months of the decision to open
proceedings, which in the case of GE/Honeywell would have been June 14, 2001.
Commission Regulation 447/98,1998 OJ. (L 61) 1, 8. The Commission did not see
any reason that would justify an extension of the given timeframe.
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important of these markets were those for jet aircraft engines, avi-
onics, and engine starters, which I will address in detail below. 1
36
To the parties involved and their lawyers, the Commission's
decision came as a total surprise.137 GE had relied on previous case
law of the Commission,'n especially the decision in Allied-
Signal/Honeywell,139 in assuming that the Commission would allow
the merger.
4.2.2.1. The Market for Jet Aircraft Engines
According to the Commission, the market for jet aircraft en-
gines had to be divided into three categories of aircraft.140 (a) large
commercial aircraft, i.e., aircraft with more than 100 seats and a
range greater than 2000 nautical miles, (b) regional jet aircraft, i.e.,
aircraft with around 30 to 90 seats and a range of less than 2000
nautical miles, and (c) corporate jet aircraft, i.e., aircraft designed
for corporate activities.141
GE, not Honeywell, was active in the market for large commer-
cial aircraft engines. Apart from GE, the players in this market
were Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce. It was undisputed that
GE's position in this market was strong. In terms of installed en-
gines, GE had an overall market share of 52.5%, compared to Pratt
136 The Commission also commented at length on other markets that are of
less importance to this Article.
137 See generally Helen Power, The Honeywell Monster, LAWYER, July 23, 2001, at
24-27 (describing the background to the Commission's decision to block the
merger).
13 Ronald A. Stern, Panel Discussion at the University of Pennsylvania Jour-
nal of International Economic Law Symposium (Apr. 12,2002).
139 AlliedSignal, supra note 115, paras. 103, 112-24, 136. One can only guess
which part of the decision led the parties to believe that the Commission would
also allow GE and Honeywell to merge, but there is strong language in the deci-
sion with regards to possible bundling. The Commission stated that its "investi-
gation ha[d] shown it to be unlikely that the potential of the new post-merger en-
tity to technically bundle products will significantly impede competition." Id.
para. 113; see infra Section 4.22.1.2 (discussing conglomerate effects and bun-
dling).
140 The Commission stated that "an engine is a complementary product to the
aircraft, the sale of one being of no value without the sale of the other. As a con-
sequence, in defining the relevant jet engines product markets, one must therefore
take into account the competition between the end-use applications-that is, be-
tween the types of aircraft that final buyers consider suitable." GE/Honeywell,
supra note 1, para. 10.
141 Id.
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& Whitney's 26.5% and Rolls-Royce's 21%.142 In terms of engine
orders as of January 1, 2001, GE had a share of 65%, compared to
Pratt & Whitney's 16% and Rolls-Royce's 19%. 143
In the market for regional aircraft engines, both GE and Hon-
eywell were again competing with Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-
Royce. However, the Commission concluded that there were dis-
tinct markets for large and small regional aircraft and found that
only GE and Honeywell were supplying engines for the large
ones.44 Of the two, GE had a market share of between 60% and
70% in the market for aircraft that were still in production, and
Honeywell, which only supplied the engine to one type of aircraft,
a market share of between 30% and 40%.145 The Commission con-
sidered GE already dominant in this market. With the acquisition
of Honeywell, GE and Honeywell's combined market share would
have amounted to 100%, making the merged entity a monopoly.
Both GE and Honeywell were active in the market for corpo-
rate aircraft engines and were competing with Pratt & Whitney
and Rolls-Royce. GE's position in this market was weaker, with
engines installed mostly in aircraft that were no longer in produc-
tion. Based on data provided by the parties, GE's market share of
overall engines installed was 10-20%, Honeywell's 40-50%, Pratt &
Whitney's 30-40%, and Rolls-Royce's 10-20%.146 Honeywell's posi-
tion in this market could therefore be described as strong, and the
combined market share of the new company after the merger
would have been between 50% and 60%.
There are two questions to be addressed in connection with the
issue of dominance. First, whether or not GE or Honeywell had al-
ready enjoyed a dominant position before the merger; and, second,
whether the merger would either create or strengthen a previously
non-existing market dominance.
The Commission did not find GE's market share of about 65%
for large aircraft engines sufficient to establish market dominance
142 See generally id. para. 70 tbl.5 (quoting data provided by the parties and
based on installed base of engines on large commercial aircraft in service on De-
cember 31, 2000). The picture is different when one looks at the market shares of
orders for engines as of January 1, 2001: there, GE has a share of 65%, Pratt &
Whitney 16%, and Rolls-Royce 19%. Id. para. 77 tbl.6.
143 Id. para. 70 tbl.6.
144 Id. paras. 19-29.
145 Id. para. 84 tbl.7.
146 Id. para. 88 tbls.9-10.
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per se, but it did find it indicative of dominance.147 Regulators had
a similar opinion regarding Honeywell's position in the market for
corporate jet aircraft engines. 48 Not surprisingly, the Commission
already deemed GE, with a market share of 60% to 70%, already
dominant149-without having to consider other factors.
Having failed to establish GE's dominance in the market for
large aircraft engines based on market share alone, the Commis-
sion had to invoke other factors that would enhance GE's position,
focusing on GE's overall strength, particularly in the area of fi-
nance. First, the Commission commented on GE's financial arm,
GE Capital.'5 0 This subsidiary managed about $370 billion, more
than 80% of GE's assets. The Commission maintained that through
the financial strength of GE Capital, GE would gain a significant
advantage over its competitors, who had nothing similar. GE
Capital could, in the view of the Commission, be used to absorb
potential product failures and strategic mistakes.i5' GE could also
use its financial strength to heavily discount prices for jet engines,
as the company had done in the past.
Moreover, the Commission argued that the financial strength
of GE Capital had and could be used to provide significant finan-
cial support to airframe manufacturers in the form of platform
program development assistance, and thus obtain a monopoly
over engines for those airframes.5 2 The Commission held that
these exclusive agreements would significantly affect the engine
market, since they guaranteed "significant penetration of an air-
147 Id. para. 83. In its OECD Submission, the DOJ appears to have understood
that the Commission let the high market share suffice for the finding of domi-
nance ("The EU's finding of dominance rested almost entirely on GE's large (65%)
and growing share of outstanding orders.") and contrasted this alleged finding
with its own results in which the DOJ found the market shares only weakly in-
dicative of competitive conditions in the market GE's large share was almost en-
tirely dependent on a single source contract with Boeing for the 737. Excluding
those sales would produce much more balanced market shares: GE 42%, Pratt &
Whitney 32%, and Rolls-Royce 27%. OECD Submission, supra note 123, at 20-23.
148 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 89.
149 Id. para. 86.
150 Id. paras. 107-20.
151 As evidence for its argument, the Commission cites the example of Rolls-
Royce who, after the failure of one of its research and development projects in the
1970s, had to exit from the relevant market Id. para. 110.
152 In return for putting in a $2 billion advance order for the long-range ver-
sion of Boeing's 777, GE was designated the exclusive engine supplier for the
plane. Id. paras. 160, 167. GE has secured a total of ten exclusive positions out of
the last twelve that were granted by airframe manufacturers. Id. para. 114.
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line's fleet and subsequent incumbency benefits." 5 3 Apart from
influencing the manufacturers of airframes, the strength of GE
Capital could also be used to influence airlines' buying decisions.
The Commission quoted from a book written by Jack Welch, then
the CEO of GE, recounting a loan that GE Capital arranged for
Continental Airlines in 1993 when the airline was in financial diffi-
culty.54 A few months later, Continental ordered GE engines for
its aircraft. 55
Next, the Commission addressed the position and powers of
GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS"), GE's airplane leasing di-
vision and the world's largest buyer of airplanes, with a share of
10% of purchases of all new aircraft. 5 6 GECAS has the largest sin-
gle fleet of aircraft with 1040 units, making it twice as big as its di-
rect competitor, International Lease Finance Corporation ("ILFC").
The Commission stated that GECAS could enhance GE's position
in the market through attractive financing packages for purchasing
deals of large aircraft. Over the past decade, of more than 600
planes purchased by GECAS, only four did not have GE engines.
While GECAS' innovative financing techniques could result in at-
tractive packages for customers, the Commission thought it would
create an unfair advantage over competitors like Rolls-Royce and
Pratt & Whitney because GECAS could demand the use of GE en-
gines on all plane purchases,15 7 which could lead to a foreclosure of
GE's competitors from the market. By contrast, the DOJ inter-
preted these figures quite differently. Apart from the fact that a
mere 10% share is substantially less than what U.S. antitrust courts
usually require to support a finding of potential foreclosure,158 the
153 Id. para. 115.
154 John Curran, GE Capital: Jack Welch's Secret Weapon, FORTUNE, Nov. 10,
1997, at 116, 120 (quoting author and management consultant Noel Tichy as say-
ing after the deal that "capital is part of the arsenal for GE's industrial side to beat
the competition") (emphasis added), quoted in GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para.
117.
155 In fact, Continental Airlines aircraft use predominantly GE engines. The
Commission showed figures according to which the airline chose GE engines over
those of its competitors every time it had a choice. See GE/Honeywell, supra note
1, para. 119 ("In other words, when Continental had a choice of engines, the air-
line chose GE engines every time.").
156 Id. para. 122.
157 Id. paras. 127-45.
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DOJ found no evidence that GECAS's policy of purchasing only
aircraft equipped with GE engines had or could foreclose rivals
from the market.
The Commission concluded that the combination of the ad-
vantages GE enjoyed through GE Capital and GECAS made GE's
high market shares "the right proxy for dominance," 15 9 aggravated
by the fact that GE's competitors were not in a position to offer
anything even close to the financial services of GE.160 The Com-
mission concluded that given the nature of the jet engine market,
GE's position with many airlines, its incentive to use GE Capital's
powers with customers, and its ability to leverage its vertical inte-
gration through GECAS, GE appeared to be in a position to behave
independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately, con-
sumers. It therefore concluded that GE could be characterized as a
dominant undertaking in the markets for large commercial and re-
gional jet aircraft engines.161
To overcome the reservations of the Commission, GE offered,
inter alia, to maintain GECAS as a separate legal entity and to con-
duct its dealings with Honeywell on an arm's-length basis.162 An
independent expert would monitor compliance. Not surprisingly,
the Commission was dissatisfied with this offer. It argued that the
158 See Kolasky, supra note 30, at 17 n.44, (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) and United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2000) ("Under U.S. law, 35-40% is typically the minimum threshold giving
rise to foreclosure concerns.")).
159 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 163.
160 Id. paras. 173-223. Presumably, this would lead to ruinous competition,
resulting in bankruptcy. Kolasky sees another interesting parallel to the discus-
sion that went on in the United States almost one hundred years earlier, stating
that "[e]ven Justice Peckham saw through" this type of argument when he held
that "a ruinous competition defense would force the court to decide what a rea-
sonable rate of profit in a particular industry should be" and that the courts were
not up to that task. See Kolasky, supra note 30, at 16 (citing United States v. Trans-
Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 372-73 (1897) (concluding "[h]ow ironic that we
should be hearing the same arguments on the other side of the Atlantic a hundred
years later")).
161 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 229.
162 Id. para. 498. GE also offered to divest 19.9% of its interest in GECAS. The
Commission rejected GE's offer because it would have left GE with a substantial
and decisive share in GECAS and would not have changed the influence of GE
over GECAS' policy. There is an argument as to whether this share would have
been sold to competitors or to the public. G6tz Drauz, head of the Merger Task
Force, stated: "We never said you have to sell it to competitors, we only said you
have to find a way to guarantee independence, and that was translated by some
as meaning you have to sell to competitors." Power, supra note 137, at 26.
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mere legal separation of the entity would not affect its manage-
ment, and control would remain in GE's hands. Most importantly,
the separation would not prevent GECAS from executing GE's
commercial strategy.165
4.2.2.1.1. Creation or Strengthening of Dominance
Through the Merger
Because GE had already enjoyed a dominant position in the
market for large commercial jet aircraft engines and regional air-
craft engines, the merger had to lead to a strengthening of this posi-
tion to meet the requirements for denying merger approval under
ECMR Article 2.164 Honeywell was only strong in the market for
corporate aircraft engines, but ECMR Article 2 required the creation
of such dominance. 165 Traditionally, when assessing this question,
the Commission can assess the vertical, horizontal, and conglomer-
ate effects of a merger.166
Since Honeywell was not active in the market for large com-
mercial jet aircraft engines, the question of horizontal effects was
limited to the market for large regional and corporate jet aircraft
engines, where both companies competed with one another. Be-
cause of GE's dominance in the market for large regional aircraft
engines, the addition of its competitor Honeywell, despite its fairly
small market share, would lead to a monopoly. 67 In the corporate
jet engine market, Honeywell was already the leading player. The
addition of GE's market share would lead to a combined market
share of 50% to 60% of the overall installed base of corporate air-
163 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 531. It must also be noted that a di-
vestiture of GECAS would, at this point, have only eliminated its financial powers
vis-A-vis the pre-existing dominance of GE in the large jet aircraft engine market.
Even if GE had sold GECAS completely and had thus convinced the Commission
that there was no pre-existing dominance by GE in this market, it is very unlikely
that the merger would have received the Commission's blessing. It would still
have been possible, indeed likely, as will be shown below, that the merger would
have created a dominant position for GE. The investigation's result would not
have changed.
164 As in the United States, the mere existence of a dominant position is not
illegal under European law, as long as this dominant position is not abused, in
which case it can be subject to a review under EC Article 82. Treaty Establishing
the European Community, supra note 65, art 82.
165 ECMR, supra note 62, art 2 § 1(b)(3).
166 WiiISH, supra note 63, at 774-78; Monti, supra note 58, at 6.
167 The increase was not small enough to qualify as insignificant under a de
minimis rule.
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craft and 80% to 90% of the installed base of engines of medium
corporate aircraft. In the Commission's view, this combination of
market share would create a dominant position.1 68
The parties responded to the Commission's findings regarding
the large regional jet aircraft engine market by offering to divest
the part of their business that manufactured engines for certain
new aircraft. While the Commission doubted that there was a pur-
chaser for the business, it held that since the engine was still in de-
velopment, the divestiture to a third party would "lead to signifi-
cant uncertainty as to the timetable of the development as well as
to the sales prospects of the aircraft."169
The concern for the vertical effects of the proposed merger with
regard to large commercial aircraft engines focused on Honey-
well's strong position in the market for engine starters. 7 0 The
Commission was concerned about the vertical foreclosure of the
competing engine manufacturers that would result from a vertical
relationship between GE as an engine manufacturer and Honey-
well as a supplier of engine starters to GE and its competitors' 7'
Following the proposed merger, the merged entity would have an
incentive to delay or disrupt the supply of Honeywell engine start-
ers to competing engine manufacturers, damaging the supply, dis-
tribution, profitability, and competitiveness of these companies.
Also, the merged entity could increase the price of engine starters
or their spares, thereby increasing rival engine manufacturers costs
and further damaging their ability to compete. This would con-
tribute to the further foreclosure of GE's competitors from the
market for large commercial aircraft engines and would strengthen
GE's dominant position. The Commission was concerned about
how GE's financial strength and vertical integration into financial
services, aircraft purchasing and leasing, and other market services
would effect Honeywell as a corporate jet aircraft engine supplier
and how they would effect the market for these engines.
The merger would also have vertical effects by bringing to-
gether the world's leading engine supplier, Honeywell, with
GECAS. Honeywell's engine and related businesses would benefit
from GE's aircraft leasing and purchasing businesses, since GE
163 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 437.
169 Id. para. 519.
170 Id. para. 420. See also infta Section 4.2.2.3. (discussing the market for en-
gine starters).
171 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 419.
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
could promote Honeywell products and services and use its in-
strumental leverage ability to secure market placement for Hon-
eywell products. In the Commission's view, the integration of
Honeywell and GE was likely to lead to the foreclosure and elimi-
nation of the ability of its competitors to invest in the development
of the next generation of corporate jet aircraft engines. Since Hon-
eywell's corporate jet aircraft engine competitors would be unable
to reproduce GE's financial strength and vertical integration, they
would eventually have to reconsider their presence in and ulti-
mately withdraw from the market, since their chances of prevailing
in a competition on the merits would be significantly reduced.172
4.2.2.1.2. Conglomerate Effects: Bundling
One of the Commission's main concerns in the GE/Honeywell
case was the new company's ability to bundle its products.17S This
was by no means an obvious concern; bundling had not played a
prominent role in European merger control before. In a similar
case, AlliedSignal, the Commission had even stated that the ability
to bundle would not significantly impede competition. 74 In
GE/Honeywell, the Commission described bundling as "a simple
business arrangement whereby a number of products are com-
bined in a package and sold for a single price." 75
Bundling is essentially a behavioral problem that addresses the
question of how a market player uses its powers. However, Euro-
pean merger control focuses on the situation of the parties and the
markets at the time of the merger, not on possible future behav-
ior.176 The tool for this is general competition law, as laid down in
EC Articles 81 and 82.177 The Commission cannot observe the sub-
172 Id. para. 442.
173 Id. paras. 349-427.
174 See AlliedSignal, supra note 115, paras. 110-14 (holding that bundling does
not have a consequential effect on competitors within the market).
175 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 293.
176 In the United States, merger control tends to be more forward-looking
than in Europe. The DOJ has jurisdiction to attack mergers that have been com-
pleted. The Commission does not have this right and can only use the tools of EC
Articles 81 and 82 to act against the newly merged company. Treaty Establishing
the European Community, supra note 65, arts. 81-82.
177 But see Giotakos, supra note 55, at 506 (criticizing this position, he states
that it would be dangerous to wait for the mechanisms of EC Article 82 to kick in
because by then "damage to competition will have already occurred and the legal
system of prevention of the creation of market power, notably through an effec-
tive merger control policy, will have failed").
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sequent behavior of the parties under merger control rules and inter-
vene if the merger later turns out to be anti-competitive.178 Euro-
pean merger control thus differs from merger control in the United
States, where the Supreme Court has held that the legality of a
merger or acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act is deter-
mined as of the time of the suit, rather than at the time of the stock
or asset acquisition.179
In the market for large commercial aircraft engines, the Com-
mission needed to show a strengthening of a dominant position.
However, it did not state that the newly merged entity would use
bundling to improve its market position. 80 Rather, the Commis-
sion thought it sufficient that the merged entity "[would] have the
ability to engage in packaged offers of engines, avionics and non-
avionic services." 18' Since none of its competitors could match this
ability, or could only do so at substantially higher costs, GE could
be expected to attract new clients and retain existing ones. Ulti-
mately, this would lead to the foreclosure of the market and the
strengthening of GE's existing dominance. 8 2 The Commission
took a similar approach with regard to the strengthening of GE's
already dominant position in the market for large regional aircraft
178 Mario Monti admitted that this was a notable difference between the
European and the U.S. systems: "We have a one shot possibility to approve or
block a merger." Philip Shishkin, EU Makes It Official: No Honeywell for GE, WALL
ST.J. EUR., July 4, 2001, at 1.
17 In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,597 (1957) the
Court stated that "the Government may proceed at any time that an acquisition
may be said with reasonable probability to contain a threat that it may lead to a
restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly of a line of commerce." The
Court ordered divestiture over thirty years after the stock interest had been ac-
quired. See also United States v. T Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 242 (1975)
("'acquisition' under section 7 is not a discrete transaction but a status which con-
tinues until the transaction is undone"); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
415 U.S. 486,505 (1974) (noting that the probability of lessening competition exists
at the time of trial).
180 The Commission did state that bundling has repeatedly occurred in the
industry. GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 352. Dimitri Giotakos, Laurent Petit,
Gaelle Gamier, and Peter de Luyk of the Directorate General of Competition
("DGIV") argue that "the incentives for the merged entity to sell bundles of prod-
ucts could have evolved over the short to medium term." Dimitri Giotakos et al.,
General Electric/Honeywell -An Insight into the Commission's Investigation and Deci-
sion, COMPETION POL'Y NEWSL., Oct. 2001, at 10.
181 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 412 (emphasis added). See also id.
paras. 434, 443 (addressing the market for large regional aircraft and corporate jet
aircraft).
182 Id. para. 412.
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engines,183 using the concept of potential bundling to determine the
creation of a dominant position for the new company.184
There are a number of points that make the Comn-mission's reli-
ance on bundling questionable. First, although it is probably true
that the new company would indeed have the potential to bundle,
and it could not be ruled out that at some point in time it might
engage in this behavior, using this mere potential to conclude that
the merger would strengthen a preexisting dominant position
within the meaning of ECMR Article 2 is problematic. It is highly
questionable that the ECMR allows a potential behavior in order to
arrive at a dominant position when there is no dear indication (a)
that this behavior will actually take place, or (b) what effects this
behavior will have (the economic effects of bundling will be dealt
with below). This is not to say that bundling goods and services,
and the possible abuse this behavior could constitute, should not
be subject to rigorous scrutiny by the Commission. On the con-
trary, the scenarios envisioned by the Commission require constant
attention. However, as has been said, the tool for this investigation
is and must be EC Article 82, not the ECMR.185
Another point that commentators hotly contested in connection
with bundling was the question of whether or not bundling, if it
did take place, impeded competition within the meaning of the
second test of ECMR Article 2. U.S. commentators argued strongly
that the Commission's reasoning lacked sufficient economic basis
and that bundling would not have a negative impact on competi-
tion. In Europe, the influence and role of economists in antitrust
decisions are weak when compared to their strong role in the
United States, especially given the increased influence of the Cli-
cago School. The GE/Honeywell decision did not deal at any great
length with the theoretical economic analysis of bundling. The
Commission stated that the competitors would be driven out of the
market because of their inability to match the bundling capacities
of the newly created company.
In its analysis, the Commission relied heavily on a model that
Jay Phil Choi developed for one of the complainants as an exten-
sion of Barry Nalebuff's research. It would be beyond the scope of
this Article to delve deeper into the issue of economic theories and
183 Id. paras. 432-34.
184 Id. paras. 443-44.
185 But see Giotakos, supra note 55, at 479-481 (arguing for the application of
the ECMR rather than Article 82).
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their impact on the Commission's decision, particularly since the
Commission made no express reference to Choi or Nalebuff and all
information available is based on statements from people present
at the Commission proceedings. In his earlier works, Nalebuff
concluded that bundling was "one of the more powerful and
prevalent tools, perhaps we should say weapons, in our informa-
tion economy."186 Interestingly, the parties retained the services of
Nalebuff for their negotiations with the Commission to evaluate
Choi's model. Nalebuff concluded that the model did not fit the
aerospace industry and that the Commission's decision had to be
reversed. He based this divergence from the Commission's ap-
proach (and his earlier findings) on the fact that the model was
built on the critical assumption that all customers pay the same
price for a product. This was, he continued, an inappropriate as-
sumption for the aerospace industry, where prices are negotiated
on a customer-by-customer basis.187 Nalebuff argued that, in real-
ity, purchasers in the aerospace industry cannot be compared to
customers who go to computer stores and face the choice between
a bundled and discounted package (e.g., Microsoft Office) and a
range of different components where all of the prices have to be
added up. Nalebuff admitted that it would be very hard for a
competitor with only one product to compete in this scenario. In
the aerospace industry, however, there are no outlets where cus-
tomers may go and pick what they need, and there are no uniform
prices. Instead, lengthy negotiations precede purchases; during
these negotiations, the sellers offer discounts and other incentives
to the purchasers. Nalebuff continued "the Commission was un-
able to point to a single case where a bundle was offered at a sig-
186 Nalebuff states:
As powerful as bundling is to a monopolist, the advantages are
even larger in the face of actual competition or potential com-
petition. Selling products as a bundle can raise profits absent
entry, raise profits even against established but uncoordinated
firms, all the while lowering profits of existing or potential en-
trants and putting these rivals in the no-win position of not
wanting to form a competing bundle.
Barry Nalebuff, Competing Against Bundles 12 (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://groups.haas
.berkeley.edu/imio/competing.pdf.
187 See Barry Nalebuff & Shihua Lu, A Bundle of Trouble - Bundling and the GE-
Honeywell Merger (proposing that, with negotiated prices and perfect information,
bundling does not impact competition), at http://www.hbs.edu/units/cs
/Conference2001/Nalebuff.pdf.
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nificant discount over the prices of the individual products."18
Nalebuff concluded that the Commission was not able to distin-
guish between a discount and a discount conditional on buying a pack-
age, and that the Commission should have realized that "to the ex-
tent that package discounts were offered, these same discounts
were extended to the individual items when the customers chose to
order on an a la carte basis."18 9
It seems that the position the Commission took was based on a
picture which very much resembled the situation of Microsoft,
where customers who all pay the same price would choose a bun-
dled and discounted product over an assembly of more expensive
components. We cannot compare this situation to the aerospace
industry, or indeed any industry, where the prices of all individual
components, not the least because of their significant cost, are indi-
vidually negotiated. Discounts are negotiated for the individual
products and not for a bundle of products. The bundling of prod-
ucts, if it happened, would thus not have the negative impact on
competition attributed to it by the Commission.
The Commission itself must have been aware of the weakness
of its arguments because it issued a statement stating that "various
economic analyses have been subject to theoretical controversy." 190
This statement can at best be described as an oversimplification
and misses the importance of the issues at stake.
The parties tried to overcome the Commission's concerns by of-
fering not to bundle.191 The Commission regarded this effort as in-
sufficient. It argued that the undertaking was "purely behavioral
and as such cannot constitute the basis for a clear elimination of the
said concerns." 92 Even more interestingly, the Commission con-
tinued by saying that by not engaging in bundling, "the parties
would become dominant or strengthen their dominant position but
promise not to abuse it." 93 Remarkably, the Commission, in its
own statement, admits that it must have erred in its earlier finding
188 Id. at 16.
189 Id. at 16.
190 Francesco Guerrera, How "Dominance" Became Europe's Dirty Word, FIN.
TiMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at 27. See also Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 18 (argu-
ing that the decision "[is] based on dubious economic grounds and very weak
evidence.").
191 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 499.
192 Id. para. 530.
193 Id. para. 532
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that the potential to bundle may be a factor for the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position. Now the Commission ap-
pears to separate bundling from the dominance issue (an approach
that would have been correct in the first place), and emphasizes the
question of whether or not bundling in and of itself amounts to an
abuse of a dominant position under EC Article 82. This is the cor-
rect approach, and the Commission should have used it from the
outset instead of using bundling as a factor in establishing the
strengthening of dominance.
Many have argued that the concept of bundling had no valid
foundation in European merger control and has not been applied
before. While the first statement appears to be correct, the second
one does not.'94 For example, in Guinness/Grand Metropolitan,195 a
decision made under the ECMR, two liquor producers and dis-
tributors proposed to merge. The Commission found that there
were different markets for different liquor; there were many coun-
tries in which the parties were not active alongside each other.
Therefore, the merger had only limited horizontal effect. 9 6 How-
ever, the Commission was of the opinion that the merger would
lead to a larger portfolio, which would benefit the new company
vis-h-vis its competitors because the new company would be able
to offer a range of products that would give it greater flexibility to
structure its prices, promotions, and discounts. The merger would
194 Francisco-Enrique Gonzales-Diaz refers to the Commission's investigation
in Tetra Pak as a precedent for its decision in GE/Honeywell. Roundtable Discus-
sion on GE/Honeywell, 16 ANTITRUST 7,11 (2001). However, this case was about
the abuse of a dominant position (with elements of predatory pricing, tying, re-
bates, etc.) under EC Article 82 and not a merger decision. While it is true that the
Commission in its assessment of dominance can and does rely on the proximity to
EC Article 82 and on the case law of the Eq pertaining to this provision, these
principles may only be applied mutatis mutandis. Cf. Kauper, supra note 55, at 321
("However 'dominant position' is defined, the language of the Merger Regulation
suggests that the Commission is likely to measure competitive harm in terms of
injury to competitors."). The case law on EC Article 82 has thus only limited rele-
vance for merger control reviews. Closer to the concept of bundling as applied by
the Commission in GE/Honeywell was an investigation of Digital Equipment under
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty. See XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, COM
(98)208 final, para. 69 (explaining that the Commission objected to the fact that
Digital offered prices that were more attractive when customers purchased soft-
ware services in a package with hardware services than when purchasing soft-
ware services alone), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/publications/broch97en.pdf.
195 Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan v. Commission, 1998 O.J.
(L 288) 24 [hereinafter Guinness/Grand Metropolitan].
196 Id. para. 31.
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bring about a higher potential for tying and would put the new
company in a position to realize economies of scale and scope in its
sales and marketing activities. 197 Thus, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan
was a "precedent" for GE/Honeywell and in its time received fierce
criticism.198 Since the parties in Guinness/Grand Metropolitan made
a number of substantial undertakings to satisfy the Commission's
requirements,199 the merger finally received the Commission's
blessing and therefore substantially less publicity than
GE/Honeywell two years later.
The Commission also identified bundling's potential threat to
competition in AlliedSignal.200 However, in that case, the Commis-
sion concluded that competition would not be impeded because,
inter alia, the position of customers was strong enough that they
would only allow bundling if it were to their own advantage. 20'
The situation in AlliedSignal was more comparable to GE/Honeywell
than Guinness/Grand Metropolitan because of the similar character-
istics of the market. Although the issue of bundling was not in-
strumental for the blocking of the merger, or more precisely, for
the reservations of the Commission that led to the parties' attempt
to comply with European merger regulations, it should be under-
stood that the Commission made it very clear that bundling had
the potential to impede competition and could thus, in a different
environment, be responsible for the blocking of a merger. In that
respect, GE/Honeywell cannot be described as unprecedented.
Having criticized the Commission's position as being without
sufficient basis in the ECMR, and having thus joined the dominant
chorus of commentators on the decision, it must also be observed
that the issue of bundling, despite the publicity it has received, was
not as decisive as it has been portrayed. In fact, it was not the ma-
197 Id. para. 40. The Commission took a similar position a few months earlier
in Case IV/M.833, The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, 1998 OJ. (L 145) 41,
where the Commission concluded that a larger portfolio of different beverages
would give a company an advantage over its competitors: "Generally this means
that companies with... the broadest portfolio of beverages in their distribution
system will have the lowest costs and be able to reach the highest number of cus-
tomers." Id. para. 68.
193 See SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION
LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 159 (1999) (stating that the
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger had no sound economic basis).
199 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, supra note 195, para. 183.
200 AlliedSignal, supra note 115, para. 110.
201 Id. para. 113.
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jor component of the actual Commission decision;2 2 most likely,
the Commission would have prohibited the merger even if they
had ignored the bundling issue, because of the merger's horizontal
and vertical effects on competition to which I have already referred
in this Article.203 One is thus compelled to ask why the Commis-
sion bothered to take on the bundling issue in the first place, and
stir up so much controversy. The Commission may well not have
foreseen this reaction, or the Commission may have wanted to base
its negative vote on as many arguments as possible in order to
make their decision more legitimate and acceptable. One desired
effect of this strategy could be to create a precedent for future deci-
sions where the Commission may have to rely on the question of
bundling.
4.2.2.2. Market for Avionics
Avionics was another key market that attracted the Commis-
sion's attention. This market was also of particular interest be-
cause it offered GE and Honeywell the opportunity to bundle
complementary products.
Avionics products include equipment used for the control of
aircraft, for navigation and communication, and the assessment of
flying conditions.204 At the time of the Commission's decision,
Honeywell had captured between 50% and 60% of the market for
avionics. Its main competitors were Rockwell Collins, with a mar-
ket share of 20% to 30% of the market; Thales, with a share of be-
tween 10% and 20% of the market; and Smiths Industries, with a
share of up to 10% of the market.20 5 In terms of sheer market share,
Honeywell's position was thus very strong.
The Commission believed that the merged entity would be able
to offer an unprecedented package of products that no single com-
petitor could challenge. The sale of complementary products
through package deals may take several forms. It may include, for
202 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 292-97,350-416,443-57.
2m See G6tz Drauz, Essay, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Con-
glomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L Lj. 885, 897 (2002)
("The core factor of the Commission's ... assessment... is the combination of
GE's financial strength and vertical integration ... with Honeywell's leading, po-
sitions in various product markets .... ").
m GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 231; AlliedSignal/Honeywell, supra
note 115, para. 10.
20-5 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, para. 242.
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instance, mixed bundling, whereby complementary products are
sold together at a price that is lower than the price charged when
the products are sold separately due to discounts applied across
the product range. It may also take the form of pure bundling,
whereby an entity sells only a bundle and does not make individ-
ual components available on a stand-alone basis.
Pure bundling may also take the form of technical bundling, in
which the individual components only function effectively as part
of a bundled system and cannot be used with components from
other suppliers. In other words, the individual components are
made incompatible with the competitor's components. 206 The pro-
posed merged entity would have been able to price its package
deals in such a way as to induce customers to buy GE and Honey-
well products rather than those of its competitors, thus increasing
the combined share of GE/Honeywell in both markets.
The Commission objected to the vertical integration of Honey-
well with GE for the same reasons they mentioned in its corporate
jet aircraft engine market analysis. The Commission felt that Hon-
eywell's combination with GE's financial strength, in addition to
vertical integration in financial services, aircraft purchasing and
leasing, and after-market services, would contribute to the foreclo-
sure effect already described.207 Following the proposed merger,
the Commission predicted that Honeywell's product range would
benefit from GE Capital's ability to secure exclusive positions for
its products with airlines and GECAS' instrumental leverage abil-
ity to foster the placement of GE Products, thus extending its "GE
only" policy to Honeywell products.208
GE's strategic use of GECAS and GE Capital's financial
strength would position Honeywell as a dominant supplier of avi-
onics, a market in which Honeywell already enjoyed a leading po-
sition. In light of their inability to produce financial strength and
integration to any significant degree, rival manufacturers would
progressively be forced to reconsider their strategies and would
eventually choose not to compete fiercely in those markets domi-
nated by the merged entity.
206 Id. para. 351.
207 Id. para. 405.
208 Id. para. 406.
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4.2.2.3. Market for Engine Starters
In view of Honeywell's horizontal position within the market
for aircraft engines2 09 the Commission also emphasized the market
for engine starters. 210 Honeywell's share in this market was esti-
mated to be between 50% and 60%. Honeywell's only real com-
petitor was Hamilton Sundstrand, with a market share of between
40% and 50%. However, since Hamilton Sundstrand's engine
starters were only installed in the engines of its sister company,
Pratt & Whitneyl they were not available in the general market.
Hamilton, therefore, could not be considered a competitor. Hon-
eywell would thus be the only large independent supplier of en-
gine starters. The Commission concluded that through the merger
with GE and its resultant horizontal effects previously discussed,
the newly formed company, GE Honeywell, would dominate the
market.212
In order to overcome the Commission's concerns in this field,
the parties offered to divest Honeywell's engine starter business.
213
The Commission interpreted this offer to mean that the would-be
divested business would not include certain parts that needed to
be purchased together. Since the new company would try to
command this part of the market, the divestiture would not have
the necessary effect 214
4.3. Conclusion
The Commission's decision in GE/Honeywell is essentially in
line with the tradition of European merger control and everything
this tradition entails. As a matter of law, the decision begins by
addressing the question of market dominance, and this is where
the first challenge to the decision can be made. The Commission
did not find that GE's and Honeywell's shares in all markets
would lead to dominance; therefore, they had to look for other
factors that would get the merged entity's position over the market
2M9 See supra Section 4.2.21.
210 GE/Honeywell, supra note 1, paras. 331-40.
211 In this respect the figures given for the market share reflect production
volume and not sales in the market Hamilton, by supplying Pratt & Whitney, has
a lower market share in the overall engine market Id. para. 338.
212 Id. para. 341.
213 Id. para. 493.
214 Id. para. 516.
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dominance threshold. Here, the Commission relied heavily on the
financial strength of GE, a line of reasoning in sync with previous
case law and one to which one cannot object. It must not be over-
looked that at this point in the analysis, the Commission was only
concerned with the question of pre-existing dominance. The ques-
tion of strengthening or creating dominance turned out to be much
more difficult and controversial. Here, the controversy, rightly or
wrongly, centered on the issue of bundling.
It is questionable whether the idea of bundling has a suffi-
ciently legitimate basis in the ECMR. This was a major issue in the
discussion about the validity of the Commission's decision. Many
argue that there was no basis for considering bundling in the
Commission's analysis in the ECMR and that the Commission, by
addressing the bundling issue, improperly changed the scope of
the ECMR. Henceforth, merger parties must fear that the Commis-
sion, when assessing a proposed merger, will not only identify the
relevant markets in the traditional sense and assess the horizontal
and vertical effects of a merger, but will also speculate on how po-
sitions in markets that are not related might be combined, even if
there is no clear evidence that such behavior will emerge. This ap-
proach not only takes away much of the legal certainty that was
the major strength of the merger control process, but also blurs the
distinction between merger control and post-merger EC Article 82
investigations. Historically, the Commission has been unwilling to
base decisions to halt a combination on the basis of speculative as-
sessment of what the Parties might do as a merged entity. The
type of behavior that the Commission had previously addressed
requires a certain degree of evidence to act upon; and in the case of
GEIHoneywell, there was not enough of that evidence available.
Therefore, it is commendable that GE and Honeywell have
launched separate appeals against the Commission's decision to
the CFI, despite the fact that the two companies will not merge in
any event.215 In a few years' time, we will know if the CFI, or ulti-
mately the ECJ, will condone the position of the Commission.
215 The parties apparently fear that competitors could use some of the Com-
mission's findings, especially those pertaining to GE's position in the jet engine
market, in future disputes and could keep the company from making future ac-
quisitions. Cf., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Paul Meller, G.E. Said to Be Planning Appeal
of Honeywell Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C4 ("The few companies that
have appealed a prohibition ruling did so, analysts said, largely to clear any ob-
stacles to future acquisitions.").
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5. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
Bearing in mind the harsh exchange of words and the hostility
that developed among observers from both sides of the Atlantic,
one of the consequences of the GE/Honeywell decision on which
almost universal agreement was reached was that similar debacles
should be avoided if at all possible. This goal can only be achieved
by abolishing or mitigating the underlying differences between the
two systems. In the following Section, I will highlight the most
important differences between the two systems, and then suggest
possible starting points for international harmonization.
5.1. Differences
After GE/Honeywell, it appears that the United States has more
astutely identified the true differences between the U.S. and Euro-
pean systems. The United States has repeatedly asserted that the
importance of consumer welfare is a, if not the, dividing line be-
tween U.S. and European approaches to competition law and pol-
icy. The European response to this has been that, as a matter of
course, consumer protection has also been a very important factor
in Europe. In fact, European lawyers argued, it was consumer
protection that would require the avoidance of dominant entities
because those dominant entities could behave in a detrimental way
for consumers, so this difference should not be overestimated.
While this argument is certainly valid at face value, it misses the
real issue-and the criticism put forward by U.S. lawyers. There
can be no doubt that consumer welfare in Europe is important;
however, consumer welfare is definitely not the starting point and
even less so the overriding interest around which the law is built.
This is contrasted to Chicago School-driven U.S. antitrust law
where consumer welfare enjoys this very position.
The substantial tests used to assess mergers do not actually dif-
fer significantly from one another. They both require an assess-
ment of the consequences of a merger for competition, and they
both ask whether or not competition is affected. It is how this
question is applied in practice and where emphasis is placed that
shows the difference between the two systems. The United States
dearly puts emphasis on efficiencies that increase consumer wel-
fare. In Europe, the emphasis is different. It is somewhat moot to
discuss how consumer welfare ranks vis-A-vis other considerations;
it is sufficient to state that it is not paramount.
587
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5.2. Solutions
From the previous paragraph, it follows that the harmonization
of antitrust law requires some agreement over what the goals of
merger regulation should be. The Commission has partially
opened the discussion by inviting comments about the future of
the MD test in its Green Paper.21 6 It even went so far as to hint that
a change from the traditional MD test to an American-style SLC
approach was not out of the question. However, suggesting that
Europe should switch from an MD to an SLC test actually misses
most of the underlying differences between the two systems, since
European law, as has been shown, already recognizes some princi-
ples associated with the SLC test. U.S. law does not have an MD
threshold, so the difference remains, but it seems marginal in com-
parison to the more fundamental difference in the goals of antitrust
law-and easier to overcome. To harmonize the MD and SLC tests
would not solve the problem; the underlying difference between
the two systems would remain. Only if the two systems agreed on
the goals of merger control could harmonization be achieved, and
at the heart of the matter is the question of how important con-
sumer welfare should be.217
It follows that for and before true harmonization, both systems
must agree on the goals of antitrust regulation. This again revives
the discussion that raged in the United States a long time ago.
Talks between the United States and Europe regarding harmoni-
zation should not focus on what their respective lawmakers in-
tended when they adopted the statutory instruments, as current
U.S. statements about the topic would suggest, but rather what the
goal of antitrust law should be today. Once the two systems have
reached an agreement in this respect, the necessary changes in the
administration and application of this goal are comparatively easy
216 Report on the Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No 4064/89, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM(2001) 745-C5-
0159/2002/2067(COS)) 7 [hereinafter Report on Commission Green Paper], avail-
able at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk /sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+
REPORT+A5-2002-0217+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=3&NAV=S&
LSTDOC=Y.
217 See id. at 11 ("[The European Parliament] [c]onsiders that the current use
of the 'dominance test' produces very similar results to those obtained using the'significant lessening of competition test' (SLC test); but believes it necessary
above all to balance this type of analysis with an overall economic and social as-
sessment evaluating veifiable efficiency gains deriving from concentrations ... )
(emphasis added).
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to achieve. The ABA's Sections of Antitrust Law and International
Law and Practice, in their joint comments on the Commission's
Green Paper, do not put the question in quite as plain terms, but
appear to have identified the questions that need to be answered
by the Europeans.218 They start by highlighting the issue of effi-
ciencies and ask whether the creation of efficiencies should be an
outright defense. More importantly, the Sections address the role
of consumer welfare in the decision to approve a merger, and show
the link between efficiencies and consumer welfare. They ask:
"[s]hould there be limits on the 'quality' or types of efficiencies that
will be recognized in order to permit an otherwise anti-competitive
merger to proceed[?] For example, should it be necessary to dem-
218 It appears that apart from the indisputable value of its comments, the
ABA did the course of harmonization a considerable disservice by simply arguing
that the Europeans should not only adopt the U.S. SLC test, while they were at it,
they should have also followed precedents from those jurisdictions who have ap-
plied the SLC test before, notably the United States and Canada. ABA Comments,
supra note 53, at 14. In the sea of issues, this is probably a minor point, but it must
have escaped the drafters of this statement, that European law, as well as conti-
nental European countries, does not even have a rule of precedent, so they in fact
told the Europeans to not only to change their merger control regime, but also to
get rid of their entire legal system and become, at least with respect to antitrust
matters, common law countries. They might as well have told the Europeans to
stay home and let U.S. and other common law lawyers take over the administra-
tion of their merger control because they are neither familiar with the SLC test nor
with the rule of precedent. Through these comments, the authors have not only
outed themselves as either ignorant or oblivious as to the situation in Europe, they
have also damaged the discussion itself. These comments not only suggest that
Europe adopt a U.S.-style test, which by itself is probably a reasonable suggestion,
but call for a complete overhaul of the legal system of the continent, if not all of
Europe. Continental European systems do not have a rule of precedent Judges
on the continent, as much as the ECJ, try to follow previous decisions in order to
make the system more predictable and reliable. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Ro-
mantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization
of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 63, 73 (2001). However, this system is
not yet comparable with common law stare decisis and the technicalities connected
therewith. Continental legal systems have no experience with the strict rule of
precedent as found in the United States and would not be able to argue a case to
accommodate this. A change from the civil law tradition to a rule of precedent
would mean a revolutionary change, much more serious than a switch from the
MD to the SLC test or even to the primacy of consumer welfare. Since this test is
unknown to most European lawyers and they are not familiar with the rule of
precedent, one could conclude that the gist of the ABA submission, is, plainly
speaking, to tell European antitrust lawyers to go home and let somebody else do
their job. The contents of this paper are not well-known in Europe; if the Europe-
ans took the paper seriously, their reaction would be fierce. This is even more re-
grettable because the U.S. position is actually a very strong one and, if well pre-
sented, could and should have a significant impact in Europe.
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onstrate that any claimed efficiencies are likely to be passed on to
consumers?" 219
The Berenguer Fuster Report on the Green Paper to the Euro-
pean Parliament appears to agree with the ABA comments, sug-
gesting that "when evaluating the benefits resulting from a con-
centration [i.e., the efficiencies], attention should focus especially
on the benefits to the economy in general and the consumer in
particular."220 The Report later downgrades (and to some extent
contradicts) itself when it says:
[A]s regards the benefits or increases in efficiency that
might result from a concentration, it is beyond dispute that
the companies involved stand to gain a great deal. The po-
tential benefits for the markets and hence the consumers di-
rectly affected are another matter altogether. When as-
sessing this subject it is important to bear in mind that the
goals related to the competitiveness of European industry
have to be brought into balance with the aim of maintaining the
necessary effective competition on the markets, because the
benefits that would initially be passed on to consumers
would otherwise ineluctably disappear in the medium
term, with no possibility of reversing the tide.221
In other words, consumer welfare should play a more promi-
nent part in merger analysis but should not have primacy, and at
the end of the day there are other factors, most notably market
competitiveness, which need to be taken into consideration and
balanced. Presumably, the Report refers here to the traditional
maintenance of a large number of competitors, among them small-
and medium-sized enterprises; the Report suggests no real change
to this scheme. By contrast, the Committee on Legal Affairs and
the Internal Market, which attached an opinion to the Report, sim-
ply dismisses any thoughts on efficiencies by stating that "the 'effi-
ciency' of a merger for the participants usually results in reduced
efficiency for the economic system to which they belong because of
the lessening of competition and should therefore not be used to
219 ABA Comments, supra note 53, at 15.
220 Report on Commission Green Paper, supra note 216, at 8-9,14.
221 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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authorise [sic] a merger which leads to a situation of domi-
nance."2
Apart from the question of how the United States and Europe
can bring differing goals in line with each other, it would appear
that the natural obstacles to harmonization are the reluctance of the
protagonists to depart from the systems to which they are accus-
tomed and also, and more importantly, from what they think is
best. Naturally, the two sides are hesitant to switch to something
they do not know very well and are convinced that the foreign
system is worse than what their countries apply today. A starting
point for harmonization, wherever it will lead, is the increase of
discussion between U.S. and European lawyers to better under-
stand not only the law, but also those who administer it. 223
222 Id. at 16. In addition, the Committee wants to retain the MD test because
of the compelling reason that "the use of the dominance test to evaluate concen-
trations currently provides a large measures of legal certainty, and therefore
should not be replaced by the criterion of 'substantial lessening of competition,'
which provides no appreciable advantage in terms of clarity and accuracy." Id. at
16-18.
M See Kolasky, supra note 30, at 23 (arguing that discussion between the
United States and the European Union is needed to promote "institutional
changes that might promote greater convergence").
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POST SCRIPT
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE'S DECISION IN TETRA LAVAL/SIDEL AS
A PRECEDENT FOR THE GE/HONEYWELL APPEAL?
On October 25, 2002, the CFI overturned the Commission's de-
cision to block the merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel.224 This
was the third defeat of the Commission in a merger control case
this year-and the second in one week, the Court having already
overturned the Commission in the cases of Airtours/First Choice223
in June and Schneider/Legrand226 earlier in October. Apart from its
potential consequences for the GE/Ioneywell appeal which will be
addressed below, these recent decisions are interesting for two
more general aspects: first they have done away with the percep-
tion that the Court would not overrule the Commission227 and, sec-
ond, that decisions would take an endless amount of time.228
In its judgment, the CFI agreed in principle that conglomerate
effects such as leveraging could lead to the strengthening or crea-
tion of a dominant position and to an impediment of competition,
and could thus be the basis for the prohibition of a merger.229 This
is an important finding because it removes doubt about the use of
this economic theory in European antitrust law.230 The Court did
224 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission (2002) [hereinafter Tetra La-
val], at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&SubmitSubmit&
docrequire=alldocs&numaff=T-5%2F02&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine
=&mots=&resmax=100.
225 Case T-342/99, Airtours plc. v. Commission (2002) [hereinafter Airtours],
at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&do-
crequire=afdocs&numaff=t-342%2F99&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine
=&mots=&resmax=100.
226 Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission (2002) [hereinafter
Schneider], at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit--
Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=t-310%2F01&datefs=&datefe=&nomusue
=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.
227 See Schmitz, supra note 5, at 353.
22 In fact, the Court took just over ten months to reach a verdict under the
new expedited procedure under Article 76(a) of the Rules of Procedure. In Air-
tours, the Court needed about eighteen months to reach a decision; in Schneider the
time was about eleven months.
229 Tetra Laval, supra note 224, paras. 146-59. The court emphasized the fact
that the ECMR Article 2(3) contains two tests, both of which need to be fulfilled.
This supports the view expressed earlier in Section 3.2.1.
230 It is not surprising that the competitors of Microsoft cheered the Court's
ruling. See Paul Geitner, EU Overturns Merger Denial, WASH. POST, Oct 25, 2002,
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not follow the hard line Chicago School approach that conglomer-
ate effects have no place in merger control at all.231 However, quasi
in a reverence for this school of thought, the Court acknowledged
that "the effects of a conglomerate-type merger are generally con-
sidered to be neutral, or even beneficial, for competition on the
markets concerned,. . . the proof of anti-competitive conglomerate
effects of such a merger calls for a precise examination, supported
by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly pro-
duce those effects." 232 As a consequence, the Court imposed a very
high threshold of evidence before conglomerate effects could lead
to the prohibition of a merger,m both in terms of the likelihood of
their occurrence and of their economic effects.
In Tetra Laval, the Court acknowledged that the question of lev-
eraging is essentially a behavioral problem2m and drew a distinc-
tion between legal and illegal behavior.35 It asserted that the
newly merged company had two means of leveraging: first, it
could apply pressure leading to tied sales or sales which bundle
equipment and consumables; second, measures could be adopted
to offer incentives, such as predatory pricing, price wars and loy-
alty rebates. Since Tetra had a dominant position in certain mar-
kets, the first behavior would constitute an abuse of a dominant
position and would thus be illegal under EC Article 82. The Com-
mission, in its decision,236 had assumed that Tetra would indeed
available at http://wwv.washingtonpostcom/wp-dyn/articles/A15766-2002
0ct25.html.
231 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 248.
232 Tetra Laval, supra note 224, para. 155.
33 Id. paras. 147,155.
234 Id. para. 154
[lit is also appropriate to distinguish, on the one hand, between a situa-
tion where a merger having conglomerate effects immediately changes
the conditions of competition on the second market and results in the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position on that market... and,
on the other hand, a situation where [this] will occur, in those circum-
stances, only after a certain time and will result from conduct engaged in
by the merged entity.... In this latter case, it is not the structure re-
sulting from the merger transaction itself which creates or strengthens a
dominant position within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Regulation,
but rather thefidure conduct in question." (emphasis added).
235 Id. paras. 217-18.
236 Case COMP/M.2146, Tetra Laval/Sidel v. Commission (2001) [hereinafter
Tetra/Sidel], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases
/decisions/m2416__en.pdf.
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engage in this type of behavior, citing as evidence certain economic
incentives to do so.23 7 For the CFI, this level of likelihood of illegal
behavior identified by the Commission was not enough. The CFI
stated that the Commission was wrong not to take into considera-
tion "the extent to which those incentives would be reduced, or
even eliminated, owing to the illegality of the conduct in question,
the likelihood of its detection, action taken by the competent
authorities .. . and the financial penalties which could ensue.
2
The Court concluded that "since the Commission did not carry out
such an assessment in the contested decision, it follows that, in so
far as the Commission's assessment is based on the possibility, or
even the probability, that Tetra will engage in such conduct in the
aseptic carton markets, its findings in this respect cannot be up-
held" .239
With regards to the second type of (legal) behavior, the Court
stated that the evidence of likelihood that it will happen (barely)
sufficed.240 In the next step, the Court required sufficient evidence
that this leveraging would lead to the strengthening or creation of
a dominant position and stated, in fairly blunt words, that the
Commission has also failed to deliver this. This high threshold of
evidence is the reverse side of the Court's decision. While the CFI
acknowledges the potential for leveraging to lead to the blocking of
a merger in principle, it requires strong economic evidence that the
alleged consequences will in fact occur, and it is this hurdle that
the Commission failed to meet in Tetra/Sidel.
The outcome in Tetra Laval thus reflects in many ways the criti-
cism after GE/Honeywell, in which it was alleged that the Comins-
sion's decision was not sufficiently based on hard and fast eco-
nomic theory and evidence; thus, there seems to be a good chance
that the Court will, in 2003, overrule the Commission in
GE/Honeywell on similar grounds. Whether this will lead to the
overturn of the entire decision remains to be seen. There were a
number of other aspects (vertical and horizontal effects of the
merger) which the Commission could put forward to arrive at its
237 Id. para. 359 ("As carton and PET are technical substitutes, when a cus-
tomer switches to PET he/she is a lost customer on the carton side of the business
either because he/she partially switched from carton or because he/she did not
switch some of the production to carton form other packaging materials.").
238 Tetra Laval, supra note 224, para. 159.
239 Id. para. 160. See also para. 218.
240 Id. paras. 216, 219 & 224.
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decision and which could, in the eyes of the Court, still suffice to
declare the merger incompatible with the Common Market. How-
ever, following its recent decisions, it can be expected that the
Court will vigorously attack large portions of the GE/Honeywell de-
cision.
One thing that has already become dear after the last decisions
is that the Commission will have to retain and rely upon the advice
of economists much more than in the past. It may have been the
lack of such involvement which made the decisions defective - and
it can be expected that the CFI will issue the same verdict with re-
spect to GE/Honeywell. Mario Monti has already indicated that,
among other changes within the organization, such expertise
would be added to the Commission.241 The same had been de-
manded and suggested by U.S. critics of GE/Honeywel1242 and it
seems that the Commission now acknowledges the validity and
benefit of this change.
241 Effective immediately, a new post of Chief Economist to his Directorate
General would be created. See Monti Faces More Defeats in Court, FRANIuRTER
ALLGEMEiNE Z~mr G, Oct. 30, 2002, at 23.
242 See supra Section 4.2.2.1.2.
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